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Addressing public health externalities often requires community-level collective action.
Each person’s sanitation behavior can affect the health of neighbors. We report on a
cluster randomized controlled trial conducted with 19,000 households in rural Bangladesh
where we randomized (1) either group financial incentives or a non-financial “social
recognition” reward, and (2) asking each household to make either a private pledge
or a public pledge to maintain hygienic latrines. The group financial reward has the
strongest impact in the short term (3 months), inducing a 7.5-12.5 percentage point
increase in hygienic latrine ownership. Getting people to publicly commit to maintaining
and using a hygienic latrine in front of their neighbors induced a 4.2-6.1 percentage
point increase in hygienic latrine ownership in the short term. In the medium term
(15 months), the effect of the financial reward dissipates while the effect of the public
commitment persists. Neither social recognition nor private commitments produce
effects statistically distinguishable from zero.
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1 Introduction
Many inexpensive, efficacious technologies with the potential to address important devel-
opment challenges are used at surprisingly low rates in developing countries (Foster and
Rosenzweig 2010). Prominent examples include drinking water disinfectants (Ashraf et al.
2010), fertilizers (Duflo et al. 2011), nutritional supplements (Maluccio et al. 2009), high-yield
crop varieties (Udry 2010), and rainfall insurance (Cole et al. 2014). The productivity and
welfare benefits of many of these technologies are potentially very large, which makes low
rates of adoption and use a central puzzle in development.
Social scientists and development practitioners have studied several explanations for low
initial adoption: poor households may be liquidity or credit constrained (Dupas and Robinson
2013), they may simply not understand a technology’s benefits (Foster and Rosenzweig
1995), they may be highly risk averse (Bryan et al. 2014), they may suffer from self-control
problems (Banerjee and Mullainathan 2010), or learning externalities may lead to inefficient
experimentation (Munshi 2003; BenYishay and Mobarak 2019). This paper tests strategies
to promote a healthier technology based on another class of explanations: that adoption
decisions may be inter-linked across households when there are public health externalities,
and interactions with neighbors may mediate those decisions.
Sanitation is a leading example of this class of problem. Health gains from a household’s
use of a hygienic latrine likely accrue largely to other households in the community (Fuller
et al. 2016; Andrés et al. 2017). One billion people, or about 15% of the world’s population,
currently practice open defecation (OD) in spite of the existence of simple, affordable pour
flush latrines that effectively confine fecal matter in sealed pits (WHO and UNICEF 2017).
Open defecation spreads bacterial, viral, and parasitic infections, including diarrhoea, polio,
cholera and hookworm and has been identified as a leading cause of child stunting (Spears
2013; Chambers and Von Medeazza 2013; Augsburg and Rodríguez-Lesmes 2018) and infant
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death (Hathi et al. 2017). Diarrheal diseases kill nearly one million people per year (Prüss-
Ustün et al. 2014), and cause nearly 20% of deaths of children under five in low income
countries (Mara et al. 2010).
Research on barriers to sanitation adoption includes studies of interventions to educate and
motivate communities (Pattanayak et al. 2009; Gertler et al. 2015), micro-finance loans
to overcome credit constraints (BenYishay, Fraker, et al. 2017; Smets et al. 2021), and
targeted subsidies to increase affordability and leverage social spillovers in adoption (Guiteras
et al. 2015; Cameron et al. 2021). There has been much academic and policy interest in
“community led total sanitation” (CLTS) interventions (Pickering et al. 2015), which aim to
bring the community together to jointly discuss the public health externality problems. In this
paper, we devise and test interventions that isolate specific aspects of the community-level
interactions in CLTS programs.
Our intervention design also pays attention to the issue of proper use and maintenance after
initial adoption.1 While adoption is necessary for health gains, it is not sufficient – hygienic
latrines will only produce health benefits if they are consistently used and are kept in good
condition so that fecal pathogens are safely isolated from the environment. This requires each
household to incur time and materials costs to keep the latrine clean, conduct maintenance
and dispose of waste properly.
The fact that the benefits largely accrue to others creates a divergence between the incidence
of benefits and costs, and with it, a classic collective action problem – while it may be in
all households’ interests collectively to use and maintain hygienic latrines, any individual
household may privately find it beneficial to deviate from the public optimum. When
institutions are strong, regulation mandating adoption and enforcing use can solve this
problem. However, in the absence of such institutions, other tools are required.
1See Coffey et al. (2014) on unused latrines in rural Northern India, Orgill-Meyer et al. (2019) and
Pakhtigian et al. (2021) on long-term use patterns in Orissa, India, and Deutschmann et al. (2021) on
pit-emptying in Dakar, Senegal.
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In this paper, we test several such tools designed to overcome this collective action problem.
Our context is rural Tanore district in Bangladesh, where, in previous research, we evaluated
a set of interventions intended to increase investment in hygienic latrines (Guiteras et al.
2015). In this study, we designed new interventions to help households overcome any collective
action failures that may be impeding ongoing consistent use. As a basic, common treatment,
we form groups of 15-20 neighboring households who participate in monthly meetings with a
health worker from a well-known NGO to discuss sanitation, OD and disease risk. On top
of this common treatment, we randomize four additional treatments. The first, “monetary
reward,” is a slight variation on the standard public finance policy prescription: a subsidy
for a well-maintained hygienic latrine. The non-standard component is an element of joint
liability: households receive the reward only if both that household’s latrine is hygienic and a
certain share of all households in the group maintain a hygienic latrine. While this payment
for environmental service scheme is appealing, it may be challenging to sustain financially, and
credible monitoring may be similarly difficult. Our second treatment, “recognition reward,”
attempts to address these shortcomings by substituting a non-pecuniary reward, a recognition
certificate from the local government.
Our third treatment, “public commitment,” explores whether a simple verbal coordination
device can sustain a cooperative equilibrium (Schelling 1960). In public commitment groups,
groups are asked to make a joint public (but non-binding) commitment in front of each
other, stating that they will try to address the OD issue in their neighborhood by using
and maintaining hygienic latrines. This public commitment could be operating through two
mechanisms: the act of making a commitment, which as an “implementation intention” can
itself spur action (Gollwitzer and Brandstätter 1997); and the fact that this commitment
was made in public with others who are making the same public commitment. Our fourth
treatment, “private commitment,” was designed to separate these two mechanisms. In groups
in the private commitment arm, households make the same pledge as those in the public
commitment arm, but this pledge is made in private.
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These interventions are implemented at a large scale, covering a sample of 19,345 households
in 107 villages, and we measure short-term (at the time of the assessment for rewards, roughly
3 months after the interventions began) and medium-term (12-15 months after assessment)
effects. We find that group-level monetary reward has the strongest impact in the short
term, inducing an 7.5 to 12.5 percentage point (pp) increase in the share of households with
hygienic latrines. The public commitment treatment caused a 4.2 to 6.1 pp increase in the
same period. Neither the non-monetary reward nor the private commitment treatments had
statistically significant impacts. In the medium term, the effect of the monetary reward
dissipates, while the effect of the public commitment treatment persists. We find that in the
case of both the monetary reward and public commitment treatments, households tended to
meet the short-run assessment criteria for hygienic status through small, relatively inexpensive
improvements to or repairs of existing latrines, rather than making large investments in
major improvements or new latrines. In the public commitment group, households tended
to maintain these small improvements into the medium-term, while those in the monetary
reward group tended to let these improvements deteriorate.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the study setting and the sample; Section
3 describes our interventions and experimental design; Section 4 describes our data; Section 5
presents our estimation equations and results, with reduced-form treatment effects in Section
5.1 and mechanisms in Section 5.2; Section 6 concludes.
2 Setting and Sample
This study was conducted with 19,271 households in 107 villages in 4 unions (sub-districts)
of Tanore district, Bangladesh. These villages were the site of a randomized evaluation of a
set of interventions designed to study interdependencies in household investment in hygienic
latrines (Guiteras et al. 2015). We refer to this first set of interventions as the “first set of
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interventions” or the “demand study interventions,” and the second set, the focus of this
paper, as the “second set of interventions” or the “incentives for use interventions.” The
study area was chosen in part because of its low level of latrine coverage: at baseline, 30.8%
of households reported a regular level of open defecation among adults, 50.4% reported that
they had access to a hygienic latrine and 40.1% owned a hygienic latrine. This first set
of interventions was conducted February 2012 – August 2012, with baseline data collected
December 2011 – February 2012 and four rounds of followup data collected through May
2013 – July 2013. Guiteras et al. (2015) show that subsidies increase adoption of hygienic
latrines, both directly – among households winning a subsidy voucher in a public lottery –
and indirectly – the share of subsidy winners was randomized at the community level, and as
this “saturation” increased, investment increased among both subsidized and unsubsidized
households. The current study was intended to understand how to sustain or increase these
gains.
In our 107 study villages, we created 1,236 groups of approximately 14-17 neighboring
households, roughly 4-16 groups per village, and the incentives-for-use interventions were
conducted at this group level. While the unit of intervention was the group, randomization
was at the village level.
3 Interventions and Experimental Design
In this section, we describe the treatments and the randomization. A timeline for a typical
village is provided in Figure 1.
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3.1 Common Intervention
All 980 treatment groups (in 84 treatment villages) received a basic intervention consisting
of monthly meetings for three consecutive months with a Health Motivator to encourage
investment in and maintenance and use of hygienic latrines.2 Health Motivators, trained
by and contracted from our implementation partner VERC, discussed the health risks of
open defecation and unhygienic sanitation practices, the collective nature of the problem
(i.e., the externality in non-technical terms), the types and costs of hygienic latrines, and the
current level and monthly change in the share of households with or advancing towards a
hygienic latrine. The intervention protocol is provided in Section SM3 of the Supplementary
Materials.
In the common as well as in the cross-cutting interventions, the Health Motivator provided
both a general, conceptual definition of a hygienic latrine and a specific, technical definition.
The conceptual definition emphasized that a hygienic latrine was one that:
1. Limits the spread of diseases caused by feces in the water and keeps the environment
pollution free;
2. Confines feces in an enclosed pit so that they cannot be seen or smelled;
3. Prevents flies or other insects from entering the pit.
The specific, technical definition listed the characteristics based on which a latrine was judged
to be hygienic, in particular:
1. There must be a slab and it cannot be broken.
2Different sources define “hygienic” in different ways, and there are also other labels such as “improved”
or “sanitary.” Conceptually, a hygienic latrine safely confines feces. For pour-flush latrines (the relevant type
in our context), this typically requires a water seal to block flies and other insects, and a sealed pit to store
fecal matter for safe disposal (Hanchett et al. 2011). In our survey data, we define an unimproved latrine as a
bucket, a simple pit with no slab or cover, or a “hanging latrine” (a platform over open land or water), and a
hygienic latrine as having a functional, non-broken slab and water seal leading to a sealed pit.
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2. There must be a water-seal (locally known as ‘gooseneck’ or ‘siphon’) and it cannot be
broken.
3. Different latrine components such as rings, delivery pipe, Y-junction (whenever ap-
plicable), pit cover (whenever applicable), etc. should be functional and without any
leaks.
4. There should not be any feces in or around the latrine.
5. The latrine cannot pollute the environment. In particular, the latrine/delivery pipe
can only discharge the waste into a sealed pit and not to the external environment (for
example, a stream or just out in the open).
These characteristics of a hygienic latrine were relayed to participants at each of the three
group meetings.3 Participants were made aware of the fact that for latrines to be considered
hygienic all the above mentioned requirements had to be met by the specified deadline,
approximately four months after the intervention began.
Health Motivators also emphasized that a latrine’s hygienic status was not just determined by
the collection of parts, but depended on maintenance, repair and sanitary use. Discussions,
both with the group and with individual households, emphasized small improvements or
repairs that could be made to achieve hygienic status, and how to maintain hygienic status
once it was achieved.
3Households were also encouraged to ensure that no gaps existed between different latrines components
that could compromise the ‘sealed’ nature of a pit. For single-pit latrines, this meant that there would not be
any gap between the cover of the slab and the top-most ring. For offset latrines (involving multiple pits or a
pit that is not situated directly below the latrine) there should not be any gap between the top-most ring
and the pit cover. Moreover, although not perfectly observed (and therefore, not a strict requirement of a




There were two reward treatments, monetary and non-monetary, both of which were condi-
tioned on both the household’s own status and the share of households in the group achieving
hygienic latrine status. This element of “joint liability” was intended to incentivize households
to motivate and assist each other.
The monetary reward consisted of a cash payment to the household if, at the end of the
intervention period, (a) the household owned a hygienic latrine and (b) the share of households
in that group with a hygienic latrine was above a designated threshold. Hygienic was defined
as described in Section 3.1 above. The reward was BDT 250 (USD 3.33) in groups that
surpassed the lower of the two thresholds and BDT 500 (USD 6.67) in groups that surpassed
the higher of the two thresholds.4 For comparison, the cost of building a single-pit hygienic
latrine was approximately BDT 2350 (USD 31.33), while common improvements to existing
latrines that would be necessary to reach hygienic status cost substantially less, e.g., a new
water seal BDT 65 (USD 0.87), delivery pipe BDT 360 (USD 4.8).
The non-monetary reward consisted of a certificate of hygiene attainment from the local
government, presented to qualifying households in a public ceremony.5 The non-monetary
reward used the same standard for “hygienic” as the monetary reward.
Thresholds were determined based on baseline hygienic latrine ownership by union. In three
of the four unions, the lower threshold was set at one-third of households and the upper
threshold at two-thirds. In one union with significantly lower hygienic latrine ownership at
baseline, the lower and upper threshold were set at one-quarter and one-half, respectively. A
lower threshold was set such that even low baseline-ownership groups would feel they could
attain something, while high baseline-ownership groups would have something to reach for.
4US dollar equivalents at 75 BDT/USD, the approximate market exchange rate at the time.
5This certificate was printed on thick glossy paper, so it could be displayed on an interior wall. However,
no weatherproof frame was provided. As a result, it would be difficult for a household to display the certificate
outdoors where it would be publicly visible.
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We also chose thresholds that were simple and easy to explain at a group meeting: a phrase
like “two out of every three households” is easier to understand than a phrase like “sixty-six
percent of all households.”
The assessment was conducted approximately four months after the intervention began,
after three group meetings with the Health Motivator. Health Motivators did not conduct
assessments in villages where they had worked. See Section 4.3 for a discussion of the
assessment process. The full survey instrument is provided in Section SM4 of the Supple-
mentary Materials. Households knew the deadline for achieving hygienic status, and that
the assessment would occur within one-two weeks after the deadline, but did not know the
specific day of the assessment.
3.3 Commitment Treatments
There were two commitment treatments, public and private.
In the public commitment arm, during each group meeting, members from all the households
of a group were encouraged to make a public pledge that those who did not yet have hygienic
latrines would meet hygienic latrine standards as set by the project. Those with hygienic
latrines pledged to help others reach the goal within the time limit set by the project. The
script of the pledge, in English translation, was: “I hereby promise before everyone present
that I will do my best to set up hygienic latrines or improve existing ones into hygienic
latrines for myself and for my neighbors by [end date].” In the public commitment arm, this
pledge was repeated at the end of each monthly group meeting.
In the private commitment arm, health motivators visited each household in the group
after each group meeting. The member of the household attending the meeting would be
encouraged by the Health Motivator to make a commitment before the health motivator that
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he/she would transform their unhygienic latrines to hygienic ones within the time limit set
by the project. The script of the pledge was identical to that in the public commitment arm.
3.4 Experimental Design
The reward and commitment treatments lead to a 3x3 design, plus a pure control group.
The design is summarized in Table 1. Although the treatments were implemented at the
group level, randomization was conducted at the village level because of the potential for
spillovers within village. We allocated approximately 25% of villages to pure control, and
then the remaining villages were intended to be allocated equally across the commitment
and reward treatments. With 107 villages (84 treatment villages), we did not expect to have
adequate power to detect interaction effects. The randomization was stratified by union.
The resulting assignment is presented in Table 1. Because of a coding error, there is some
imbalance in the number of villages per cell. Most significantly, the basic treatment only cell
was under-populated (8 villages), so we will use Wild bootstrap standard errors for inference
in our group-level analyses (MacKinnon and Webb 2017; Roodman et al. 2019). Descriptive
statistics and balancing tests for key baseline observables are provided in Table 2.
4 Data
The full timeline of all data-collection activities for a typical village is presented in Figure 1.
4.1 Previous Surveys
As noted above, several rounds of surveys had been conducted for the previous demand study.
Specifically, these were: a census, a baseline (conducted on a 50% subsample, stratified by
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village) and four monitoring rounds focused on latrine improvements and condition. In this
study, we primarily use: the census data on landless status, social networks, in particular
who households identify as local leaders; the third followup monitoring round, in which we
collected location data to assist in creating groups and to construct density measures.
4.2 Baseline Latrine Coverage
A few months before beginning the interventions in this study, we conducted what we will
refer to as the “baseline” survey for this study.6 We collected data from all households
on latrine ownership, including detailed information on the condition of each household’s
latrine. This allowed us to classify each household’s latrine as “none,” “non-hygienic,” or
“hygienic.” We include hanging latrines (an exposed platform over a marsh or stream) and
uncovered pits in the “none” category, since these are effectively the same as open defecation
in terms of disease, and cannot possibly be transformed into a hygienic latrine through simple
improvements. This provided our baseline measures of our outcome variables. We used these
data to determine union-specific thresholds for the reward treatments when designing the
interventions.
4.3 Short-term Outcomes
At the end of the intervention, we collected data on latrine investment, use and maintenance.
In reward and recognition groups, these data were collected as part of the reward determination
process. These data were collected 1-2 weeks after the program’s end date; households knew
the general time frame but not the specific date. For budgetary reasons and because Health
Motivators already had the training to assess latrine conditions, we used Health Motivators
6This was the fourth round of followup data-collection for the project as a whole. We will refer to the
baseline survey for the overall project as the “demand study baseline.” See Figure 1 for the full project
timeline.
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to collect these data, but no Health Motivator collected data in a village where he or she
had led an intervention. The Health Motivators that collected data were not informed of
the village’s treatment status, nor which Health Motivators had led the intervention in that
village. Similarly, Health Motivators were not told which of their peers had collected the
evaluation data in villages where they had led the intervention. In addition, to understand
the mechanisms for the success or failure of the intervention, households were asked whether
they received any assistance (financial, labor, advice) from community members, and whether
they were pressured or encouraged by others in their group.
The criteria by which a household’s latrine was judged “hygienic” for the purpose of the
reward are given in Section 3.2. See the Supplementary Materials for precise definitions for
coding the outcome variables of interest (Section SM1) and the survey instrument (Section
SM4). Data were collected following the same protocol in all villages, regardless of treatment
status.
4.4 Medium-term Outcomes
Medium-term outcome data were collected 12-15 months after the assessment (June 2015
– August 2015). This round served as an endline survey for the project as a whole, and
so included several lengthy socio-economic and demographic modules. Because of budget
constraints, we conducted this survey with the 50% subsample surveyed at baseline in the
demand study (see Sec. 4.1 above). The baseline subsampling was stratified by village, and
since the sub-village groups for this study had not been created yet, our endline subsample
was unbalanced across groups. To avoid under-sampling groups, we identified any groups with
fewer than six households included in the endline sample, determined how many households
would be needed to have endline data for six households in the group, and randomly sampled
that many additional households in the group. With this “top-up” sample, we conducted a
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brief endline survey on latrine status only, using the same modules on latrine status, use and
maintenance as with those households receiving the full endline survey.
5 Estimation and Results
5.1 Program Effects
To measure reduced-form effects of our treatments, we estimate
ygv = β0 + β1Incentv + β2Certv + β3Privv + β4Publv (1)
+ δy0gv + γShareLandlessgv + φu + εgv
where ygv is the outcome variable of interest (e.g., share of households owning a hygienic
latrine) for group g in village v, Incentv and Certv are indicators for village v’s reward
treatment assignment (financial incentive and social incentive, respectively), Privv and Publv
are indicators for village v’s commitment treatment assignment (private commitment and
public commitment, respectively), y0gv is the pre-intervention level of the outcome variable
(McKenzie 2012), ShareLandlessgv is the share of landless households in the group, which
proxies for the financial resources available to the group as a whole, φu is a set of union fixed
effects, and εgv is an error term which may be correlated at the village level (the level of
randomization).
The coefficients β1 and β2 represent the effects of the reward treatments, controlling for
potential imbalances in the commitment treatment, while coefficients β3 and β4 represent
the effects of the commitment treatment, controlling for potential imbalances in the reward
treatment.7 These effects are conditional on receiving the common messaging treatment,
7As discussed in Muralidharan et al. (2020), in a factorial (interacted) design, the interpretation of
coefficients in this “short” regression depends on priors about interaction effects. In the presence of interactions
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and we do not include pure control villages. That is, the omitted category in our main
specifications consists of villages receiving the common messaging treatment, but no other
treatment (cell A in Table 1), and our estimates should be interpreted as effects relative to
this basic, common treatment.8
Our main outcome of interest is the share of households in the group household owning a
hygienic latrine. As discussed in Sections 3.1 and 4, “hygienic” refers not just to the physical
components (especially, water seal and sealed pit), but also the condition of these components
(e.g., no leaks). Ideally, we would like to estimate effects on actual use and open defecation
but these are difficult to measure objectively. Households may overstate the condition of
their latrine and understate their rate of open defecation because of social desirability bias,
and this is especially likely when a reward or their reputation may be at stake. In contrast,
whether a household owns a hygienic latrine and whether that latrine is being kept clean
can be assessed in a fairly objective manner. Our evaluation visits were unannounced so
households could not meet our criteria by rushing to complete a repair or a major cleaning,
although we cannot rule out that news of the assessment team’s arrival in the village would
spread in time to allow a household to conduct some minor cleaning.
Short-term results
Table 3 reports the short-term effects of the different treatment arms. We estimate equation
(1) without controls in column 1, then add union fixed effects, the baseline value of the
outcome variable, and the share of households in the group that are landless in columns 2,
3 and 4, respectively. The last of these is our pre-specified preferred model. The unit of
between treatments, Incentv, for example, should be interpreted as the average effect of the incentive treatment
in a context where some groups are receiving no other treatment, some the public commitment treatment,
and some the private commitment treatment. When we estimate fully interacted factorial models, we see
little evidence of interaction effects (see Figures B1 and B2), but as Muralidharan et al. (2020) point out,
these tests have low power. In retrospect, it would have been preferable to design the experiment without
treatment interactions.
8This basic treatment had no effect on our main outcomes when compared to pure control, see Appendix
A
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observation is the group, and groups are weighted by the number of households in the group,
although results are not sensitive to weighting (see Appendix Table B1). We report standard
errors robust to clustering at the village level (the level of randomization) in parentheses.
Additionally, in brackets we report 95% confidence intervals from wild cluster bootstrapping
for our coefficients of interest (MacKinnon and Webb 2017; Roodman et al. 2019). Estimated
coefficients from column 4, with 95% confidence intervals, are plotted in Figure 2.
As shown in Table 3, the monetary reward treatment is most effective at increasing hygienic
latrine ownership in the short term. The point estimate ranges from +7.5 to +12.5 percentage
points (pp) depending on the specification, relative to an omitted category mean of 45.1%.
The public commitment treatment increases ownership by 4.2 to 6.1 pp. The effects of the
reward certificate and the private commitment are both economically small and statistically
insignificant.
It is possible that the impact of these interventions on the overall health environment
could be greater than just the effect on ownership if households allow others to use their
hygienic latrine. However, when we use access to a hygienic latrine as the outcome variable
rather than ownership, we see little evidence of this (see Appendix Table B2). In Appendix
Table B3, we see that households appear to pay attention to the specific requirement built
into our intervention: unlike hygienic latrine ownership, ‘any latrine ownership’ (including
non-hygienic) does not respond at all.
We prioritize our direct observation of the latrine condition as our preferred outcome rather
than self-reported open defecation, because data on these short-term outcomes were collected
as part of the end-of-intervention assessment and therefore even more prone to bias than
usual.We see little impact on self-reported open defecation, as shown in Appendix Table B4.
This implies that the successful interventions appear to be inducing households already using
latrines to continue to do so while upgrading their existing latrines, rather than persuading
open defecators to build new latrines or use existing latrines.
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Medium-term results
To measure effects in the medium-term, we again estimate equation (1) using endline ownership
(12-15 months after the intervention) as the outcome variable. The results are reported
in Table 4, with estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from the pre-specified
preferred specification (column (4) in the table) plotted in Figure 3. The effect of the
monetary reward has faded (+1.0 to +5.2 pp, p < 0.1 in only one of four specifications),
while the effect of the public commitment treatment persists (+6.1 to +7.6 pp, p < 0.05
in all specifications). As in the short term, neither the reward certificate nor the private
commitment have statistically significant effects. Again, these results are not sensitive to
weighting (see Appendix Table B5).
There may be some enhancement of the effect of the public commitment treatment on the
community environment beyond ownership, as its effect on access is slightly greater (8-9
percentage points increase in access; see Appendix Table B6). While this is plausible given
that the public commitment treatment placed greater emphasis on collective responsibility
than the other treatments, we consider this only suggestive, since the marginal gain in ‘access’
over ‘ownership’ is only an extra 1-2 pp. As with the short-term results, the effects are
concentrated on ‘hygienic latrines’ (the target of our intervention design), not ‘any latrine’
(see Appendix Table B7). Similarly, the effects of the interventions on household self-reported
open defecation remain small (Appendix Table B8).9
9For comparability with the short-term followup, we also report results using open defecation as inferred
from the surveyor’s assessment. Again, we find no effect, see Appendix Table B9.
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5.2 Mechanisms
Household investments and behavior
The clear pattern that emerges is that monetary rewards produce the largest short-term
gains in hygienic latrine ownership which dissipates, while the public commitment treatment
produces a steady increase which persists for at least a year or more. In this section, we delve
into our detailed data on latrine components to understand the specific investment decisions
households made under different treatments that could produce these patterns. The effects
we show in Tables 3 and 4 could have been produced by either households investing in entirely
new hygienic latrines, or making smaller investments to maintain or improve their existing
latrines. We directly asked all households these questions - and find no significant effect of
any treatment on “construction of a new latrine since Nov 1, 2013” (which is the start of our
intervention period). In contrast, we find significant effects on “purchased/installed specific
latrine components since Nov 1, 2013”.
In Tables 5 and 6, we investigate the specific latrine components the households prioritized for
investment. We show effects on the three most important components that – when properly
installed, functional and unbroken – define a latrine to be hygienic. These components are a
concrete slab (on which the ceramic pan is placed, where the user squats), a water seal (to
prevent bad smells and flies from moving in and out of the pit where the waste is stored),
and the cover for the latrine pit and rings that safely confines the accumulated waste and
prevents any leakages. We see statistically significant investments in all three components
in the short-run under the monetary reward treatment, but this dissipates in the medium
term. In contrast, we observe a significant 4.9 pp increase in functional, intact pit cover and
rings in the medium term under the public commitment treatment. One characteristic that
distinguishes the pit cover from the other components is that it sits outside the toilet and its
privacy shield (since the pits have to be emptied periodically, and are designed to be ‘offset’
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from the toilet and not directly underneath), and therefore more easily visible to neighbors.
Under the ‘public commitment’ treatment, we detect investments in the component that
neighbors can more easily monitor.
Some analogous patterns emerge in Tables 7 and 8, where we examine outcomes related to
latrine maintenance. We orient all variables so that one corresponds to better condition
and zero to worse. We assign one to households that own a latrine with the specified
desirable characteristic, and zero to households that either own a latrine without the desired
characteristic or do not own a latrine. The proxies analyzed are no bad smell noticed, no
leaks observed, and whether water and soap for hand-washing are present at or near the
latrine. Again, there are improvements in all dimensions in the short-run under the monetary
reward treatment, which dissipate after a year. In contrast, there are statistically significant
effects on avoiding bad smells and leaks in the medium terms under the public commitment
treatment.
Again, smells and pit leaks are the most visible components of maintenance, as opposed to
water, soap and flies inside the toilet, which are aspects that neighbors cannot easily monitor.
Avoiding leaks and smells requires the household to invest in fixing broken pit covers and
rings, which are precisely the components we observed statistically significant improvements
in Table 6. In summary, the data are consistent with the households who were asked to make
a public commitment to maintain and use hygienic latrines making the investments in both
latrine components and maintenance that avoid the most obvious, visible failures that can
create slippage into a ‘non-hygienic’ sanitation territory.
In Table 9, we study the nature of interactions between households within the same treatment
group, to investigate whether the interventions generated any conversations, cooperation,
advice, or reciprocity that ultimately produced the changes in investment behavior. We show
effects of the treatments on indicators for whether the household reports receiving different
types of assistance or information from their neighbors, or pressure from others in the group.
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Generally speaking, all treatments led to greater assistance, advice and information sharing,
so our interventions were successful in achieving the immediate, proximate goal. But we
don’t observe any clear pattern that helps explain why those conversations and assistance
converted into persistent hygienic latrine maintenance effects in the ‘public commitment’
treatment.
Household Characteristics
To examine the extent to which program effects vary with respect to household characteristics,
we modify equation (1) in two ways: by using household-level data and by interacting
household characteristics with treatments. Specifically, we estimate




βp · 1 {1Treatv = p} +
4∑
p=1
θp · 1 {Treatv = p} × Dhgv
+ δy0gv + γShareLandlessgv + φu + εhgv
where yhgv is the outcome variable of interest for household h in group g in village v, Dhgv
is a characteristic of household h, 1 {Treatv = p} is an indicator for the treatment status of
village v, i.e., p = 1, 2, 3, 4 refer to financial incentive, social incentive, private commitment
and public commitment, respectively, and all other variables are as defined in equation (1).
The coefficient α1 represents the level effect of characteristic D, i.e., the association of D with
the outcome variable ygv in the comparison group, the coefficient βp represents the level effect
of treatment p, i.e., the effect of treatment p on households with D = 0, and the coefficient θp
is the interaction between treatment p and characteristic D.10 We will focus on the primary
outcome of hygienic latrine ownership unless otherwise noted, and will present results for
10For comparison with the group-level results, we estimate equation (2) with no household characteristics
or interactions in Appendix Tables B10 (short-term) and B11 (medium-term). The results are very close to
the corresponding group-level estimates in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.
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the monetary reward and public commitment treatments, with full regression results for all
treatments in Appendix tables.
We first examine whether households’ responsiveness differ by poverty, which we proxy by
landlessness. We hypothesized that landless households would be less able to respond to
the non-monetary arms but might benefit from cross-subsidization in the monetary arms.
In fact, in the short term, landless households responded nearly identically, as shown in
Figure 4a. (Regression results reported in Appendix Table C1.) In the medium term (Figure
4b), point estimates suggest some heterogeneity in response: both the fading of the effect
of the monetary treatment and the sustained effect of the public commitment treatment is
among landed households, although in neither case do the estimated interaction terms reach
statistical significance (Appendix Table C2).
We also investigate heterogeneity by the household’s baseline ownership status. Households
are classified as owning none (the base category), owning a non-hygienic latrine, or owning
a hygienic latrine. We hypothesized that households owning a non-hygienic or hygienic
latrine at baseline would be relatively more responsive to the non-monetary treatments than
households owning no latrine at baseline, since these households might need only minor
improvements to reach (in the case of owners of non-hygienic latrines) or sustain (in the case
of owners of hygienic latrines) hygienic status. Similarly for the monetary reward treatment,
because the reward amount was not large relative to the cost of a new hygienic latrine, we
expected larger effects in the higher baseline categories, although there was greater potential
for cross-subsidization of households owning no latrine in the monetary reward arm.
These predictions largely hold in the medium term, although not in the short term. In the
short term (Figure 5a, Appendix Table C3), the effects of both the monetary reward and
public commitment treatment are similar across baseline ownership status categories. In the
medium term (Figure 5b, Appendix Table C4), the point estimates indicate larger impacts
among households owning a non-hygienic latrine at baseline, although these either do not
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reach statistical significance (monetary reward) or are only borderline statistically significant
(public committment). That the public commitment treatment’s effect is sustained into the
medium term largely through its effect on this group suggests that modest improvements to
existing latrines were more sustainable than major efforts to build a new, hygienic latrine
quickly.
Group Characteristics
Ex post, we conducted an exploratory analysis of the association between group-level charac-
teristics and the magnitude of treatment effects. Similar to equation 2, we estimate




βp · 1 {1Treatv = p} +
4∑
p=1
θp · 1 {Treatv = p} × Dgv
+ δy0gv + γShareLandlessgv + φu + εgv
where ygv is the outcome variable of interest for group g in village v, Dgv is a characteristic of
group g and all other variables are as defined in equation (2). The coefficient α1 represents
the level effect of characteristic D, i.e., the association of D with the outcome variable ygv in
the comparison group, the coefficient βp represents the level effect of treatment p, i.e., the
effect of treatment p on groups with D = 0,11 and the coefficient θp is the interaction between
treatment p and characteristic D.
We considered the following characteristics, which were relevant as proxies for resources
available to the group, baseline sanitation status, or group social cohesion:
• Share of landless households in the group
• Baseline ownership of hygienic latrines
• Baseline ownership of non-hygienic latrines
11For continuous D, we de-mean the interaction variable so βp represents the effect of treatment p on
groups with the mean level of D (Wainer 2000).
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• Baseline ownership of any latrine
• Whether the group contained an individual considered by others in the village to be a
village leader
• Group size (number of households)
• Group density (the average number of households within 50m of each household in the
group)
• Two social network statistics calculated using baseline data on household relationships
within the village
– Maximum eigenvalue of adjacency matrix, interpretable as the speed at which
information will spread within the group
– The second eigenvalue of the stochastized adjacency matrix, interpretable as how
segregated a network is, i.e., negatively related to the extent to which information
will spread within the group
Overall, we do not find strong evidence of an association between these variables and the size
of our estimated treatment effects. There is a weak negative association between the share
of landless household in the group and the effectiveness of the monetary reward treatment,
although only in the short term (Tables D1-D2). Contrary to our expectation, the presence
of a village leader in a group is negatively associated with the effectiveness of the monetary
reward and reward certificate treatments, although again only in the short term (Tables
D9-D10). The effectiveness of the monetary reward treatment is negatively associated with
the network segregation measure, once again in the short term only (Tables D17-D18). Given
the large number of hypotheses tested and the relatively low power to detect interactions, we
view these results as suggestive only.
6 Conclusion
While there has been widespread recognition in the development economics literature that
investments in welfare-improving technologies with the potential to address important de-
velopment challenges has remained puzzlingly low, scant attention has been paid to inter-
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dependencies in decision-making. We design a series of interventions to explore whether we
can promote investments in a healthier technology to address an important public health
externality by taking advantage of the fact that coordination schemes that help communities
overcome collective action failures. The two specific strategies we tested were creating a joint
financial liability by offering a joint monetary or non-monetary reward, and by encouraging
community members to publicly commit to pursuing healthier behaviors in front of their
neighbors, so that both their own, and their neighbors’ health would improve.
We find that the monetary reward has the largest effect in the short term (3 months),
increasing the share of households with hygienic latrines by 7.5 to 12.5 percentage points.
The public commitment treatment lead to a 4.2 to 6.1 pp increase in the same period. The
effect of the monetary reward faded in the medium term (15 months), while the effect of
the public commitment treatment persisted. We find that this difference is explained by
households in the public commitment treatment maintaining improvements in publicly visible
components of the latrine. We find little evidence of heterogeneity in impacts with respect to
group characteristics.
Our results are immediately relevant for policymakers in South Asia and other developing
countries struggling with the stubborn problem of low investment in improved sanitation
and hygiene. They are also more broadly relevant for development economists studying the
under-investment in a broader range of (seemingly beneficial) products, technologies and
behaviors, including hand-washing and masks (Abaluck et al 2021) that became especially
relevant during the COVID-19 pandemic. We highlight decision inter-dependencies as a
driving factor for adoption of product categories that may impose externalities on other
members of society, or are strategic complements in investment. Our direct comparison of
incentives and rewards (both monetary and in-kind) against public commitments contribute
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Reward None Private Public
None A: 8 villages; 121 groups B: 11 villages; 177 groups C: 11 villages; 69 groups
1,898 households (9.8%) 2,626 households (13.6%) 1,088 households (5.6%)
Monetary D: 10 villages; 79 groups E: 5 villages; 58 groups F: 9 villages; 97 groups
1,159 households (6.0%) 885 households (4.6%) 1,568 households (8.1%)
Certificate G: 12 villages; 145 groups H: 9 villages; 110 groups I: 9 villages; 124 groups
2,314 households (12.0%) 1,694 households (8.8%) 1,970 households (10.2%)
Pure Control J: 23 villages; 256 groups
4,069 households (21.1%)
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Balance Tests
Pure Basic Reward Commitment
Treatment: All Control Only Monetary Certificate Private Public Joint
Mean Mean Mean Diff Diff Diff Diff p-val.
(S.D.) (S.D.) (S.D.) [S.E.] [S.E.] [S.E.] [S.E.]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Group characteristics:
Group size (num. HH) 15.59 15.89 15.69 −0.25 0.09 −0.60 0.27 0.286
(2.74) (2.78) (2.48) [0.51] [0.46] [0.47] [0.48]
Share landless 0.350 0.363 0.312 0.054 0.025 0.031 0.027 0.852
(0.243) (0.251) (0.208) [0.042] [0.033] [0.034] [0.036]
Regular open defecation by adults 0.263 0.270 0.199 0.082∗ 0.035 0.073 0.049 0.675
(HH self-report) (0.250) (0.251) (0.224) [0.045] [0.045] [0.049] [0.044]
Density (mean num. HH within 50m) 12.33 11.69 13.67 −1.81 −1.03 −0.87 −1.18 0.884
(6.07) (5.74) (6.58) [1.39] [1.43] [1.43] [1.55]
Village leader in group 0.153 0.156 0.116 0.072∗∗ 0.032 0.009 0.060∗ 0.376
(0.360) (0.364) (0.321) [0.035] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032]
Baseline latrine ownership:
Owns no latrine 0.403 0.394 0.377 0.014 0.012 0.040 0.008 0.187
(0.202) (0.195) (0.188) [0.026] [0.029] [0.033] [0.029]
Owns any latrine 0.597 0.606 0.623 −0.014 −0.012 −0.040 −0.008 0.187
(0.202) (0.195) (0.188) [0.026] [0.029] [0.033] [0.029]
Owns non-hygienic latrine 0.214 0.244 0.212 0.000 −0.015 −0.007 0.001 0.903
(0.154) (0.155) (0.151) [0.024] [0.025] [0.025] [0.026]
Owns hygienic latrine 0.397 0.374 0.435 −0.023 −0.006 −0.043 −0.016 0.625
(0.218) (0.201) (0.203) [0.040] [0.044] [0.050] [0.041]
Baseline latrine access:
No latrine access 0.211 0.196 0.170 0.042 0.024 0.061 0.028 0.525
(0.223) (0.205) (0.209) [0.039] [0.039] [0.043] [0.040]
Access to any latrine 0.789 0.804 0.830 −0.042 −0.024 −0.061 −0.028 0.525
(0.223) (0.205) (0.209) [0.039] [0.039] [0.043] [0.040]
Access to hygienic latrine 0.491 0.466 0.533 −0.031 0.001 −0.053 −0.015 0.496
(0.257) (0.242) (0.232) [0.046] [0.052] [0.056] [0.048]
Sample sizes:
Villages 107 23 8 24 30 25 29
Groups 1, 236 256 121 234 379 345 290
Households 19, 271 4, 069 1, 898 3, 612 5, 978 5, 205 4, 626
Notes: this table presents summary statistics (means and standard deviations) of key baseline variables
for all villages (Column 1), pure control villages (Column 2) and villages where groups received only the
basic health messaging treatment (Column 3). Standard deviations are in parentheses. Columns 4-7 show
estimated coefficients for indicators for the village-level treatments (monetary reward, reward certificate,
private commitment, public commitment) in regressions where the baseline variable is the dependent variable,
and the basic health messaging treatment is the omitted category. Estimated standard errors robust to
clustering at the village level are in brackets. Column 8 shows the p-value on a joint F-test of significance of
the treatment indicators. Sample sizes do not sum because villages may be assigned to one reward treatment,
one commitment treatment, one from each category, or neither. (See discussion of experimental design in the
text.) ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3: Short-term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward 0.100∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.035) (0.015) (0.015)
[0.007, 0.198] [0.050, 0.204] [0.039, 0.105] [0.043, 0.106]
Reward certificate 0.051 0.043 0.009 0.010
(0.044) (0.037) (0.012) (0.012)
[-0.050, 0.151] [-0.048, 0.129] [-0.019, 0.037] [-0.017, 0.037]
Private commitment 0.002 0.010 0.011 0.010
(0.044) (0.038) (0.012) (0.012)
[-0.098, 0.104] [-0.074, 0.100] [-0.017, 0.038] [-0.017, 0.037]
Public commitment 0.056 0.061 0.042∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.037) (0.015) (0.015)
[-0.034, 0.143] [-0.023, 0.144] [0.008, 0.077] [0.008, 0.077]
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.748∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023)
Share of households landless -0.067∗∗∗
(0.017)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 980 980 980 980
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.451 0.451 0.451 0.451
Omitted category S.D. (0.189) (0.189) (0.189) (0.189)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with a hygienic latrine in the short term
(at the time of assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The sample
excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received basic health message
on hygienic latrines and sanitation practices. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.
Wild cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling at the village
level, in brackets for the coefficients of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Medium-term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward 0.041 0.052∗ 0.010 0.015
(0.036) (0.030) (0.019) (0.019)
[-0.036, 0.119] [-0.014, 0.119] [-0.030, 0.051] [-0.026, 0.054]
Reward certificate 0.045 0.042 0.016 0.018
(0.038) (0.035) (0.023) (0.022)
[-0.043, 0.131] [-0.041, 0.123] [-0.037, 0.066] [-0.032, 0.066]
Private commitment 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.011
(0.040) (0.039) (0.025) (0.024)
[-0.084, 0.101] [-0.079, 0.101] [-0.046, 0.067] [-0.046, 0.065]
Public commitment 0.075∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.029) (0.017) (0.017)
[0.006, 0.145] [0.014, 0.137] [0.026, 0.096] [0.025, 0.096]
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.578∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.039)
Share of households landless -0.107∗∗∗
(0.032)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 979 979 979 979
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.544 0.544 0.544 0.544
Omitted category S.D. (0.255) (0.255) (0.255) (0.255)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with a hygienic latrine in the medium
term (12-15 months after assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households.
The sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received basic
health message on hygienic latrines and sanitation practices. Standard errors clustered at the village level in
parentheses. Wild cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling at
the village level, in brackets for the coefficients of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Short-term Effects: Latrine Components Functional and Unbroken
(1) (2) (3)
Slab Seal Pit Cover and Rings
Monetary reward 0.029∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.014) (0.021)
Reward certificate 0.011 0.009 0.027
(0.016) (0.011) (0.019)
Private commitment -0.006 0.003 0.006
(0.015) (0.011) (0.020)
Public commitment 0.002 0.018 0.039∗
(0.019) (0.013) (0.020)
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.539∗∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.022) (0.041)
Share of households landless -0.058∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -0.021
(0.023) (0.019) (0.026)
Union FEs Yes Yes Yes
Number of households 14,430 14,094 14,430
Number of groups 980 980 980
Number of villages 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.664 0.484 0.522
Notes: this table shows estimated treatment effects on indicators for whether the household owns a latrine
with the component indicated in the column header functional and unbroken in the short term (at the time
of assessment). The sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of households in
groups that received the basic health messaging treatment. Standard errors clustered at the village level in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Medium-term Effects: Latrine Components Functional and Unbroken
(1) (2) (3)
Slab Seal Pit Cover and Rings
Monetary reward -0.008 0.025 0.003
(0.017) (0.022) (0.023)
Reward certificate 0.016 0.024 0.023
(0.019) (0.023) (0.027)
Private commitment 0.002 -0.001 -0.003
(0.020) (0.025) (0.029)
Public commitment 0.014 0.016 0.049∗∗
(0.014) (0.020) (0.020)
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.432∗∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.038) (0.045)
Share of households landless -0.136∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.032) (0.027)
Union FEs Yes Yes Yes
Number of households 6,282 6,206 6,269
Number of groups 979 979 979
Number of villages 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.734 0.604 0.642
Notes: this table shows estimated treatment effects on indicators for whether the household owns a latrine
with the component indicated in the column header functional and unbroken in the medium term (12-15
months after assessment). The sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of
households in groups that received the basic health messaging treatment. Standard errors clustered at the
village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 7: Short-term Effects: Latrine Condition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No Bad Smell No Leaks No Flies Water Soap
Monetary reward 0.083∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.018) (0.024) (0.019) (0.019)
Reward certificate -0.022 0.009 0.053∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.001
(0.026) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021)
Private commitment -0.027 0.005 0.024 0.018 0.026
(0.026) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.023)
Public commitment 0.037 0.033∗ 0.029 -0.030∗ 0.011
(0.023) (0.020) (0.022) (0.018) (0.017)
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.500∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.029) (0.035)
Share of households landless -0.023 -0.005 -0.020 -0.096∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.028) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023)
Union FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of households 14,426 14,427 14,414 14,150 14,147
Number of groups 980 980 980 980 980
Number of villages 84 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.323 0.614 0.340 0.398 0.299
Notes: this table shows estimated treatment effects on indicators of the household latrine condition noted in
the column header. in the short term (at the time of assessment). The sample excludes pure control villages,
so the omitted category consists of households in groups that received the basic health messaging treatment.
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 8: Medium-term Effects: Latrine Condition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No Bad Smell No Leaks No Flies Water Soap
Monetary reward -0.056 0.016 -0.001 0.027 0.028
(0.042) (0.019) (0.037) (0.028) (0.029)
Reward certificate -0.065∗ 0.012 -0.093∗ 0.009 0.044∗
(0.033) (0.021) (0.054) (0.030) (0.025)
Private commitment -0.001 0.004 -0.069 -0.005 0.029
(0.034) (0.023) (0.057) (0.032) (0.028)
Public commitment 0.081∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.023 0.022 0.026
(0.039) (0.018) (0.042) (0.025) (0.026)
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.236∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.037) (0.057) (0.055) (0.052)
Share of households landless -0.087∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.030) (0.040) (0.037) (0.042)
Union FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of households 6,284 6,282 6,280 6,015 6,282
Number of groups 979 979 979 979 979
Number of villages 84 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.314 0.700 0.417 0.534 0.387
Notes: this table shows estimated treatment effects on indicators of the household latrine condition noted in
the column header. in the medium term (12-15 months after assessment). The sample excludes pure control
villages, so the omitted category consists of households in groups that received the basic health messaging
treatment. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 9: Short-term Effects: Assistance from others in group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any Advice or info. Materials, cash, labor Privately Publicly Pressure
Monetary reward 0.141∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.036 0.131∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.002) (0.026) (0.030) (0.031)
Reward certificate 0.079∗∗ 0.077∗∗ -0.000 0.037 0.080∗∗ 0.034∗
(0.036) (0.037) (0.001) (0.026) (0.040) (0.019)
Private commitment 0.087∗∗ 0.086∗∗ -0.000 0.018 0.081∗ 0.019
(0.039) (0.040) (0.001) (0.027) (0.043) (0.020)
Public commitment 0.065∗ 0.063∗ 0.003∗ 0.021 0.048 0.046∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.002) (0.034) (0.031) (0.025)
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.212∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ -0.003 0.088∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.044) (0.002) (0.035) (0.044) (0.030)
Share of households landless 0.026 0.027 -0.002 0.018 0.046∗ 0.029
(0.033) (0.033) (0.002) (0.030) (0.026) (0.026)
Union FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of households 14,116 14,055 14,055 14,098 14,098 14,103
Number of groups 980 980 980 980 980 980
Number of villages 84 84 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.258 0.259 0.001 0.187 0.183 0.153
Notes: this table shows estimated treatment effects on indicators of indicators for different types of assistance
(noted in the column header) the household reports receiving from others in the group. in the short term
(at the time of assessment). The sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of
households in groups that received the basic health messaging treatment. Standard errors clustered at the
village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Project Activities Data Collection
Census: Sep 2011
Demand Study Baseline: Jan 2012
(50% subsample)
R1: Apr 2012
Latrine Promotion and Subsidy Lotteries:
Apr 2012




R4 / Incentives Study Baseline: 
Jun 2013
Group Meetings Begin: Nov 2013
Group Meetings End: Feb 2013
Evaluation and Reward: Apr 2014
R5 / Short-Term Followup: 
Apr 2014
Endline / Med.-Term Followup: 
Jun 2015 (50% subsample)
Demand Study
Incentives Study
Groups Formed, Randomization: 
Sep 2013
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Reward treatment Commitment treatment
Certificate Monetary Private Public
Point estimate 95% CI
Notes: this graph presents estimated treatment effects of the interventions on the share of households in the group
with a hygienic latrine in the short term (at the time of assessment). The regression includes for the baseline level of
the outcome variable, the share of households in the group that are landless, and union fixed effects. Observations
(groups) are weighted by the number of households. The sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted
category consists of groups that received basic health message on hygienic latrines and sanitation practices. 95%
confidence intervals use standard errors clustered at the village level (the level of randomization).
38














Reward treatment Commitment treatment
Certificate Monetary Private Public
Point estimate 95% CI
Notes: this graph presents estimated treatment effects of the interventions on the share of households in the group
with a hygienic latrine in the medium term (12-15 months after assessment). The regression includes for the
baseline level of the outcome variable, the share of households in the group that are landless, and union fixed effects.
Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The sample excludes pure control villages, so the
omitted category consists of groups that received basic health message on hygienic latrines and sanitation practices.
95% confidence intervals use standard errors clustered at the village level (the level of randomization).
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Figure 4: Effect on Hygienic Latrine Ownership





Monetary Reward Public Commitment
Landed Landless Landed Landless






Monetary Reward Public Commitment
Landed Landless Landed Landless
Point estimate 95% CI
Notes: these graphs present estimated treatment effects of the Monetary Reward and Public Commitment treatments
on ownership of a hygienic latrine by household land ownership status. The top panel shows short-term effects and
the bottom panel shows medium-term effects. The comparison group consists of households in villages receiving
only the basic health intervention. The regression controls for group-level baseline hygienic latrine ownership, group
share of landless households, and union fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals use standard errors clustered at the
village level (the level of randomization).
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Figure 5: Effect on Hygienic Latrine Ownership







Monetary Reward Public Commitment
None Non-hygienic Hygienic None Non-hygienic Hygienic








Monetary Reward Public Commitment
None Non-hygienic Hygienic None Non-hygienic Hygienic
Point estimate 95% CI
Notes: these graphs present estimated treatment effects of the Monetary Reward and Public Commitment treatments
on ownership of a hygienic latrine by category of baseline latrine ownership. The top panel shows short-term effects
and the bottom panel shows medium-term effects. The comparison group consists of households in villages receiving
only the basic health intervention. The regression controls for group-level baseline hygienic latrine ownership, group
share of landless households, and union fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals use standard errors clustered at the
village level (the level of randomization).
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Appendix Tables and Figures
A Effect of Basic Information Treatment
Hygienic Ownership
Table A1: Short Term Hygienic Ownership (Weighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common treatment only 0.043 0.046 0.011 0.009
(0.033) (0.035) (0.028) (0.027)
[-0.038, 0.113] [-0.047, 0.131] [-0.068, 0.083] [-0.067, 0.079]
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.708∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.049)
Share of households landless -0.106∗∗∗
(0.037)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 377 377 376 376
Number of villages 31 31 31 31
Omitted category mean 0.399 0.399 0.401 0.401
Omitted category S.D. (0.240) (0.240) (0.240) (0.240)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with a hygienic latrine in the short term
(at the time of assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The sample
consists of villages either in the pure control group or receiving only the basic health messaging treatment, so
the omitted category consists of groups in pure control villages. Standard errors clustered at the village level
in parentheses. Wild cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling
at the village level, in brackets for the coefficient of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A2: Short Term Hygienic Ownership (Unweighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common treatment only 0.053 0.055 0.012 0.010
(0.033) (0.034) (0.028) (0.027)
[-0.024, 0.122] [-0.037, 0.138] [-0.067, 0.083] [-0.066, 0.079]
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.702∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.051)
Share of households landless -0.111∗∗∗
(0.040)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 377 377 376 376
Number of villages 31 31 31 31
Omitted category mean 0.399 0.399 0.401 0.401
Omitted category S.D. (0.240) (0.240) (0.240) (0.240)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with a hygienic latrine in the short
term (at the time of assessment). Observations (groups) are unweighted. The sample consists of villages either
in the pure control group or receiving only the basic health messaging treatment, so the omitted category
consists of groups in pure control villages. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. Wild
cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling at the village level,
in brackets for the coefficient of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A3: Medium Term Hygienic Ownership (Weighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common treatment only 0.002 0.023 -0.000 -0.002
(0.036) (0.030) (0.025) (0.024)
[-0.078, 0.093] [-0.044, 0.094] [-0.058, 0.060] [-0.059, 0.058]
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.459∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.075)
Share of households landless -0.064
(0.068)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 377 377 376 376
Number of villages 31 31 31 31
Omitted category mean 0.540 0.540 0.543 0.543
Omitted category S.D. (0.249) (0.249) (0.247) (0.247)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with a hygienic latrine in the medium
term (12-15 months after assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households.
The sample consists of villages either in the pure control group or receiving only the basic health messaging
treatment, so the omitted category consists of groups in pure control villages. Standard errors clustered at the
village level in parentheses. Wild cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals,
resampling at the village level, in brackets for the coefficient of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A4: Medium Term Hygienic Ownership (Unweighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common treatment only 0.003 0.023 -0.005 -0.007
(0.037) (0.028) (0.023) (0.023)
[-0.076, 0.098] [-0.045, 0.090] [-0.061, 0.052] [-0.061, 0.048]
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.450∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.076)
Share of households landless -0.074
(0.070)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 377 377 376 376
Number of villages 31 31 31 31
Omitted category mean 0.540 0.540 0.543 0.543
Omitted category S.D. (0.249) (0.249) (0.247) (0.247)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with a hygienic latrine in the medium
term (12-15 months after assessment). Observations (groups) are unweighted. The sample consists of villages
either in the pure control group or receiving only the basic health messaging treatment, so the omitted category
consists of groups in pure control villages. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. Wild
cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling at the village level,
in brackets for the coefficient of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Hygienic Access
Table A5: Short Term Hygienic Access (Weighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common treatment only 0.033 0.040 -0.001 -0.003
(0.036) (0.038) (0.031) (0.031)
[-0.051, 0.113] [-0.056, 0.129] [-0.080, 0.081] [-0.083, 0.078]
Hygienic latrine access (group share, R4) 0.696∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.043)
Share of households landless -0.115∗∗∗
(0.042)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 377 377 377 377
Number of villages 31 31 31 31
Omitted category mean 0.484 0.484 0.484 0.484
Omitted category S.D. (0.268) (0.268) (0.268) (0.268)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with access to a hygienic latrine in the
short term (at the time of assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households.
The sample consists of villages either in the pure control group or receiving only the basic health messaging
treatment, so the omitted category consists of groups in pure control villages. Standard errors clustered at the
village level in parentheses. Wild cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals,
resampling at the village level, in brackets for the coefficient of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A6: Short Term Hygienic Access (Unweighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common treatment only 0.044 0.050 0.001 -0.001
(0.036) (0.037) (0.032) (0.031)
[-0.038, 0.123] [-0.047, 0.140] [-0.083, 0.083] [-0.083, 0.079]
Hygienic latrine access (group share, R4) 0.687∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.044)
Share of households landless -0.113∗∗∗
(0.040)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 377 377 377 377
Number of villages 31 31 31 31
Omitted category mean 0.484 0.484 0.484 0.484
Omitted category S.D. (0.268) (0.268) (0.268) (0.268)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with access to a hygienic latrine in
the short term (at the time of assessment). Observations (groups) are unweighted. The sample consists of
villages either in the pure control group or receiving only the basic health messaging treatment, so the omitted
category consists of groups in pure control villages. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.
Wild cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling at the village
level, in brackets for the coefficient of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A7: Medium Term Hygienic Access (Weighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common treatment only -0.007 0.013 -0.011 -0.012
(0.039) (0.032) (0.029) (0.028)
[-0.096, 0.089] [-0.062, 0.096] [-0.079, 0.064] [-0.081, 0.061]
Hygienic latrine access (group share, R4) 0.399∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.073)
Share of households landless -0.050
(0.069)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 377 377 377 377
Number of villages 31 31 31 31
Omitted category mean 0.636 0.636 0.636 0.636
Omitted category S.D. (0.253) (0.253) (0.253) (0.253)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with access to a hygienic latrine in
the medium term (12-15 months after assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of
households. The sample consists of villages either in the pure control group or receiving only the basic health
messaging treatment, so the omitted category consists of groups in pure control villages. Standard errors
clustered at the village level in parentheses. Wild cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95%
confidence intervals, resampling at the village level, in brackets for the coefficient of interest. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A8: Medium Term Hygienic Access (Unweighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common treatment only -0.009 0.010 -0.017 -0.018
(0.039) (0.031) (0.028) (0.027)
[-0.096, 0.088] [-0.064, 0.090] [-0.084, 0.055] [-0.084, 0.051]
Hygienic latrine access (group share, R4) 0.385∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.074)
Share of households landless -0.075
(0.067)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 377 377 377 377
Number of villages 31 31 31 31
Omitted category mean 0.636 0.636 0.636 0.636
Omitted category S.D. (0.253) (0.253) (0.253) (0.253)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with access to a hygienic latrine in the
medium term (12-15 months after assessment). Observations (groups) are unweighted. The sample consists
of villages either in the pure control group or receiving only the basic health messaging treatment, so the
omitted category consists of groups in pure control villages. Standard errors clustered at the village level in
parentheses. Wild cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling at
the village level, in brackets for the coefficient of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Any Ownership
Table A9: Short Term Any Ownership (Weighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common treatment only 0.037 0.034 0.031 0.026
(0.032) (0.028) (0.026) (0.025)
[-0.027, 0.130] [-0.035, 0.098] [-0.039, 0.090] [-0.042, 0.081]
Any latrine ownership (group share, R4) 0.738∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.067)
Share of households landless -0.132∗∗∗
(0.043)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 377 377 376 376
Number of villages 31 31 31 31
Omitted category mean 0.666 0.666 0.669 0.669
Omitted category S.D. (0.229) (0.229) (0.225) (0.225)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with any latrine in the short term
(at the time of assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The sample
consists of villages either in the pure control group or receiving only the basic health messaging treatment, so
the omitted category consists of groups in pure control villages. Standard errors clustered at the village level
in parentheses. Wild cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling
at the village level, in brackets for the coefficient of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A10: Short Term Any Ownership (Unweighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common treatment only 0.047 0.044 0.036 0.030
(0.033) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024)
[-0.019, 0.139] [-0.022, 0.104] [-0.032, 0.090] [-0.035, 0.082]
Any latrine ownership (group share, R4) 0.739∗∗∗ 0.677∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.070)
Share of households landless -0.134∗∗∗
(0.041)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 377 377 376 376
Number of villages 31 31 31 31
Omitted category mean 0.666 0.666 0.669 0.669
Omitted category S.D. (0.229) (0.229) (0.225) (0.225)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with any latrine in the short term
(at the time of assessment). Observations (groups) are unweighted. The sample consists of villages either
in the pure control group or receiving only the basic health messaging treatment, so the omitted category
consists of groups in pure control villages. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. Wild
cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling at the village level,
in brackets for the coefficient of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A11: Medium Term Any Ownership (Weighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common treatment only 0.008 0.027 0.025 0.021
(0.034) (0.028) (0.025) (0.025)
[-0.062, 0.098] [-0.039, 0.092] [-0.039, 0.081] [-0.044, 0.078]
Any latrine ownership (group share, R4) 0.529∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.066)
Share of households landless -0.086∗
(0.047)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 377 377 376 376
Number of villages 31 31 31 31
Omitted category mean 0.768 0.768 0.771 0.771
Omitted category S.D. (0.203) (0.203) (0.198) (0.198)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with any latrine in the medium term
(12-15 months after assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The sample
consists of villages either in the pure control group or receiving only the basic health messaging treatment, so
the omitted category consists of groups in pure control villages. Standard errors clustered at the village level
in parentheses. Wild cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling
at the village level, in brackets for the coefficient of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A12: Medium Term Any Ownership (Unweighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common treatment only 0.015 0.033 0.026 0.023
(0.035) (0.028) (0.024) (0.025)
[-0.061, 0.104] [-0.035, 0.097] [-0.038, 0.083] [-0.042, 0.078]
Any latrine ownership (group share, R4) 0.517∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.069)
Share of households landless -0.085
(0.052)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 377 377 376 376
Number of villages 31 31 31 31
Omitted category mean 0.768 0.768 0.771 0.771
Omitted category S.D. (0.203) (0.203) (0.198) (0.198)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with any latrine in the medium term
(12-15 months after assessment). Observations (groups) are unweighted. The sample consists of villages either
in the pure control group or receiving only the basic health messaging treatment, so the omitted category
consists of groups in pure control villages. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. Wild
cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling at the village level,
in brackets for the coefficient of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Any Access
Table A13: Short Term Any Access (Weighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common treatment only 0.008 0.008 -0.011 -0.015
(0.035) (0.029) (0.016) (0.016)
[-0.068, 0.104] [-0.062, 0.084] [-0.049, 0.028] [-0.054, 0.025]
Any latrine access (group share, R4) 0.717∗∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.057)
Share of households landless -0.114∗∗
(0.050)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 377 377 377 377
Number of villages 31 31 31 31
Omitted category mean 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.850
Omitted category S.D. (0.208) (0.208) (0.208) (0.208)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with access to any hygienic latrine in
the short term (at the time of assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households.
The sample consists of villages either in the pure control group or receiving only the basic health messaging
treatment, so the omitted category consists of groups in pure control villages. Standard errors clustered at the
village level in parentheses. Wild cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals,
resampling at the village level, in brackets for the coefficient of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A14: Short Term Any Access (Unweighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common treatment only 0.018 0.017 -0.008 -0.011
(0.036) (0.030) (0.017) (0.018)
[-0.060, 0.113] [-0.054, 0.092] [-0.049, 0.034] [-0.054, 0.033]
Any latrine access (group share, R4) 0.720∗∗∗ 0.680∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.054)
Share of households landless -0.105∗∗
(0.047)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 377 377 377 377
Number of villages 31 31 31 31
Omitted category mean 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.850
Omitted category S.D. (0.208) (0.208) (0.208) (0.208)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with access to any hygienic latrine
in the short term (at the time of assessment). Observations (groups) are unweighted. The sample consists
of villages either in the pure control group or receiving only the basic health messaging treatment, so the
omitted category consists of groups in pure control villages. Standard errors clustered at the village level in
parentheses. Wild cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling at
the village level, in brackets for the coefficient of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A15: Medium Term Any Access (Weighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common treatment only -0.003 0.008 -0.004 -0.005
(0.030) (0.027) (0.020) (0.020)
[-0.072, 0.074] [-0.055, 0.080] [-0.054, 0.044] [-0.058, 0.045]
Any latrine access (group share, R4) 0.474∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.081)
Share of households landless -0.037
(0.045)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 377 377 377 377
Number of villages 31 31 31 31
Omitted category mean 0.916 0.916 0.916 0.916
Omitted category S.D. (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with access to any hygienic latrine
in the medium term (12-15 months after assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number
of households. The sample consists of villages either in the pure control group or receiving only the basic
health messaging treatment, so the omitted category consists of groups in pure control villages. Standard
errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. Wild cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights)
95% confidence intervals, resampling at the village level, in brackets for the coefficient of interest. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A16: Medium Term Any Access (Unweighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common treatment only 0.002 0.013 -0.003 -0.005
(0.032) (0.028) (0.021) (0.022)
[-0.073, 0.078] [-0.055, 0.085] [-0.059, 0.050] [-0.063, 0.050]
Any latrine access (group share, R4) 0.475∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.083)
Share of households landless -0.037
(0.044)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 377 377 377 377
Number of villages 31 31 31 31
Omitted category mean 0.916 0.916 0.916 0.916
Omitted category S.D. (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with access to any hygienic latrine
in the medium term (12-15 months after assessment). Observations (groups) are unweighted. The sample
consists of villages either in the pure control group or receiving only the basic health messaging treatment, so
the omitted category consists of groups in pure control villages. Standard errors clustered at the village level
in parentheses. Wild cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling
at the village level, in brackets for the coefficient of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Open Defecation (Surveyor Assessment)
Table A17: Short Term OD (Weighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common treatment only -0.008 -0.008 -0.003 -0.000
(0.035) (0.029) (0.012) (0.013)
[-0.104, 0.066] [-0.085, 0.060] [-0.030, 0.025] [-0.029, 0.030]
Open defecation (group share, R4) 0.775∗∗∗ 0.748∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.058)
Share of households landless 0.057
(0.038)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 377 377 377 377
Number of villages 31 31 31 31
Omitted category mean 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150
Omitted category S.D. (0.208) (0.208) (0.208) (0.208)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households primarily practicing OD in the short term (at the
time of assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The sample consists
of villages either in the pure control group or receiving only the basic health messaging treatment, so the
omitted category consists of groups in pure control villages. Standard errors clustered at the village level in
parentheses. Wild cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling at
the village level, in brackets for the coefficient of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A18: Short Term OD (Unweighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common treatment only -0.018 -0.017 -0.006 -0.003
(0.036) (0.030) (0.013) (0.014)
[-0.111, 0.060] [-0.093, 0.054] [-0.035, 0.026] [-0.035, 0.031]
Open defecation (group share, R4) 0.774∗∗∗ 0.749∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.054)
Share of households landless 0.055
(0.037)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 377 377 377 377
Number of villages 31 31 31 31
Omitted category mean 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150
Omitted category S.D. (0.208) (0.208) (0.208) (0.208)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households primarily practicing OD in the short term (at the
time of assessment). Observations (groups) are unweighted. The sample consists of villages either in the pure
control group or receiving only the basic health messaging treatment, so the omitted category consists of
groups in pure control villages. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. Wild cluster
bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling at the village level, in
brackets for the coefficient of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A19: Medium Term OD (Weighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common treatment only 0.003 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005
(0.030) (0.027) (0.018) (0.018)
[-0.075, 0.072] [-0.080, 0.054] [-0.047, 0.042] [-0.048, 0.045]
Open defecation (group share, R4) 0.501∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.080)
Share of households landless 0.003
(0.046)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 377 377 377 377
Number of villages 31 31 31 31
Omitted category mean 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084
Omitted category S.D. (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households primarily practicing OD in the medium term (12-15
months after assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The sample
consists of villages either in the pure control group or receiving only the basic health messaging treatment, so
the omitted category consists of groups in pure control villages. Standard errors clustered at the village level
in parentheses. Wild cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling
at the village level, in brackets for the coefficient of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A20: Medium Term OD (Unweighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common treatment only -0.002 -0.013 -0.005 -0.005
(0.032) (0.028) (0.019) (0.019)
[-0.078, 0.074] [-0.084, 0.056] [-0.051, 0.045] [-0.051, 0.048]
Open defecation (group share, R4) 0.501∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.082)
Share of households landless 0.006
(0.044)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 377 377 377 377
Number of villages 31 31 31 31
Omitted category mean 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084
Omitted category S.D. (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households primarily practicing OD in the medium term (12-15
months after assessment). Observations (groups) are unweighted. The sample consists of villages either
in the pure control group or receiving only the basic health messaging treatment, so the omitted category
consists of groups in pure control villages. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. Wild
cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling at the village level,
in brackets for the coefficient of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Open Defecation (HH Self-report, endline only)
Table A21: Medium Term OD (Weighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common treatment only -0.125 -0.247∗∗ -0.222∗∗ -0.220∗∗
(0.112) (0.099) (0.103) (0.102)
[-0.360, 0.156] [-0.470, 0.004] [-0.457, 0.053] [-0.453, 0.045]
Open defecation (group share, R4) 0.376∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.087)
Share of households landless 0.101
(0.068)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 377 377 377 377
Number of villages 31 31 31 31
Omitted category mean 0.469 0.469 0.469 0.469
Omitted category S.D. (0.355) (0.355) (0.355) (0.355)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households regularly practicing OD in the medium term (12-15
months after assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The sample
consists of villages either in the pure control group or receiving only the basic health messaging treatment, so
the omitted category consists of groups in pure control villages. Standard errors clustered at the village level
in parentheses. Wild cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling
at the village level, in brackets for the coefficient of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A22: Medium Term OD (Unweighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common treatment only -0.124 -0.239∗∗ -0.212∗ -0.209∗
(0.116) (0.100) (0.105) (0.104)
[-0.366, 0.171] [-0.463, 0.023] [-0.448, 0.068] [-0.449, 0.062]
Open defecation (group share, R4) 0.370∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.086)
Share of households landless 0.102
(0.069)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 377 377 377 377
Number of villages 31 31 31 31
Omitted category mean 0.469 0.469 0.469 0.469
Omitted category S.D. (0.355) (0.355) (0.355) (0.355)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households regularly practicing OD in the medium term (12-15
months after assessment). Observations (groups) are unweighted. The sample consists of villages either
in the pure control group or receiving only the basic health messaging treatment, so the omitted category
consists of groups in pure control villages. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. Wild
cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling at the village level,
in brackets for the coefficient of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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B Program Effects







No Reward Certificate Monetary
Private Public None Private Public None Private Public
Point estimate 95% CI
Control group consists of basic treatment villages only. Drops pure controls.
Controls: round 4 ownership share, share landless, union fixed effects.
Share of households owning a hygienic latrine (R5)
Effect by treatment arm
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No Reward Certificate Monetary
Private Public None Private Public None Private Public
Point estimate 95% CI
Control group consists of basic treatment villages only. Drops pure controls.
Controls: round 4 ownership share, share landless, union fixed effects.
Share of households owning a hygienic latrine (Endline)
Effect by treatment arm
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Table B1: Short-term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
Unweighted Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward 0.098∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.036) (0.016) (0.016)
[0.000, 0.196] [0.047, 0.205] [0.038, 0.107] [0.041, 0.110]
Reward certificate 0.056 0.047 0.010 0.011
(0.046) (0.039) (0.013) (0.012)
[-0.052, 0.163] [-0.050, 0.139] [-0.018, 0.037] [-0.017, 0.038]
Private commitment 0.007 0.014 0.013 0.012
(0.046) (0.040) (0.012) (0.012)
[-0.094, 0.114] [-0.074, 0.108] [-0.016, 0.040] [-0.017, 0.039]
Public commitment 0.057 0.065∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.038) (0.016) (0.016)
[-0.036, 0.148] [-0.020, 0.151] [0.007, 0.079] [0.007, 0.079]
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.753∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022)
Share of households landless -0.064∗∗∗
(0.017)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 980 980 980 980
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.451 0.451 0.451 0.451
Omitted category S.D. (0.189) (0.189) (0.189) (0.189)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with a hygienic latrine in the short
term (at the time of assessment). Observations (groups) are unweighted. The sample excludes pure control
villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received basic health message on hygienic latrines
and sanitation practices. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. Wild cluster bootstrap
(9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling at the village level, in brackets for the
coefficients of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B2: Short-term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Access
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward 0.098∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.038) (0.018) (0.018)
[-0.004, 0.202] [0.044, 0.205] [0.033, 0.110] [0.037, 0.113]
Reward certificate 0.060 0.051 0.005 0.007
(0.050) (0.044) (0.016) (0.016)
[-0.058, 0.174] [-0.059, 0.151] [-0.031, 0.042] [-0.029, 0.043]
Private commitment 0.014 0.023 0.031∗∗ 0.030∗
(0.050) (0.045) (0.015) (0.015)
[-0.100, 0.127] [-0.074, 0.127] [-0.002, 0.063] [-0.003, 0.062]
Public commitment 0.065 0.069 0.052∗∗ 0.051∗∗
(0.048) (0.043) (0.021) (0.021)
[-0.038, 0.167] [-0.027, 0.168] [0.002, 0.101] [0.002, 0.102]
Hygienic latrine access (group share, R4) 0.726∗∗∗ 0.698∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.029)
Share of households landless -0.080∗∗∗
(0.025)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 980 980 980 980
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.528 0.528 0.528 0.528
Omitted category S.D. (0.218) (0.218) (0.218) (0.218)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with access to a hygienic latrine in the
short term (at the time of assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households.
The sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received basic
health message on hygienic latrines and sanitation practices. Standard errors clustered at the village level in
parentheses. Wild cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling at
the village level, in brackets for the coefficients of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B3: Short-term Effects: Any Latrine Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward 0.059∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.022 0.024∗
(0.030) (0.023) (0.014) (0.014)
[-0.002, 0.122] [0.010, 0.108] [-0.008, 0.054] [-0.006, 0.056]
Reward certificate 0.030 0.028 0.002 0.003
(0.029) (0.025) (0.012) (0.012)
[-0.039, 0.092] [-0.031, 0.087] [-0.024, 0.027] [-0.023, 0.028]
Private commitment -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004
(0.029) (0.027) (0.012) (0.012)
[-0.070, 0.055] [-0.064, 0.059] [-0.029, 0.022] [-0.029, 0.020]
Public commitment 0.026 0.015 -0.002 -0.002
(0.027) (0.023) (0.015) (0.015)
[-0.033, 0.082] [-0.036, 0.065] [-0.037, 0.030] [-0.038, 0.030]
Any latrine ownership (group share, R4) 0.714∗∗∗ 0.689∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.032)
Share of households landless -0.074∗∗∗
(0.022)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 980 980 980 980
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.713 0.713 0.713 0.713
Omitted category S.D. (0.204) (0.204) (0.204) (0.204)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with any latrine in the short term
(at the time of assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The sample
excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received basic health message
on hygienic latrines and sanitation practices. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.
Wild cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling at the village
level, in brackets for the coefficients of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B4: Short-term Effects: Open Defecation
Based on surveyor assessment of household’s primary latrine
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward -0.037 -0.032 -0.001 -0.002
(0.033) (0.025) (0.012) (0.012)
[-0.106, 0.032] [-0.087, 0.020] [-0.028, 0.025] [-0.029, 0.024]
Reward certificate -0.041 -0.041 -0.003 -0.004
(0.031) (0.026) (0.009) (0.010)
[-0.105, 0.027] [-0.097, 0.019] [-0.024, 0.016] [-0.025, 0.016]
Private commitment 0.015 0.014 -0.001 -0.000
(0.030) (0.027) (0.010) (0.010)
[-0.047, 0.081] [-0.043, 0.076] [-0.023, 0.019] [-0.022, 0.020]
Public commitment -0.004 0.010 -0.003 -0.003
(0.030) (0.025) (0.009) (0.009)
[-0.066, 0.060] [-0.043, 0.064] [-0.024, 0.017] [-0.022, 0.018]
Open defecation (group share, R4) 0.779∗∗∗ 0.763∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.029)
Share of households landless 0.045∗∗
(0.021)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 980 980 980 980
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.132 0.132 0.132 0.132
Omitted category S.D. (0.195) (0.195) (0.195) (0.195)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households primarily practicing OD in the short term (at
the time of assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The sample
excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received basic health message
on hygienic latrines and sanitation practices. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.
Wild cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling at the village
level, in brackets for the coefficients of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B5: Medium-term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
Unweighted Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward 0.039 0.053∗ 0.012 0.016
(0.036) (0.031) (0.020) (0.019)
[-0.038, 0.115] [-0.015, 0.122] [-0.030, 0.053] [-0.025, 0.056]
Reward certificate 0.048 0.045 0.016 0.017
(0.040) (0.038) (0.023) (0.022)
[-0.045, 0.139] [-0.045, 0.132] [-0.037, 0.066] [-0.034, 0.066]
Private commitment 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.014
(0.042) (0.041) (0.025) (0.024)
[-0.084, 0.111] [-0.082, 0.113] [-0.045, 0.070] [-0.045, 0.068]
Public commitment 0.081∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.030) (0.018) (0.018)
[0.013, 0.150] [0.021, 0.147] [0.030, 0.103] [0.029, 0.102]
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.586∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.040)
Share of households landless -0.102∗∗∗
(0.033)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 979 979 979 979
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.544 0.544 0.544 0.544
Omitted category S.D. (0.255) (0.255) (0.255) (0.255)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with a hygienic latrine in the medium
term (12-15 months after assessment). Observations (groups) are unweighted. The sample excludes pure
control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received basic health message on hygienic
latrines and sanitation practices. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. Wild cluster
bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling at the village level, in
brackets for the coefficients of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B6: Medium-term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Access
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward 0.028 0.035 -0.001 0.003
(0.039) (0.034) (0.023) (0.022)
[-0.054, 0.112] [-0.040, 0.108] [-0.049, 0.046] [-0.044, 0.049]
Reward certificate 0.046 0.044 0.013 0.014
(0.046) (0.043) (0.028) (0.028)
[-0.060, 0.150] [-0.059, 0.145] [-0.053, 0.074] [-0.049, 0.076]
Private commitment 0.019 0.021 0.027 0.025
(0.048) (0.047) (0.031) (0.030)
[-0.091, 0.128] [-0.087, 0.131] [-0.051, 0.097] [-0.052, 0.095]
Public commitment 0.094∗∗ 0.090∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.034) (0.022) (0.022)
[0.013, 0.177] [0.015, 0.167] [0.031, 0.126] [0.031, 0.126]
Hygienic latrine access (group share, R4) 0.500∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.042)
Share of households landless -0.099∗∗∗
(0.033)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 979 979 979 979
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.627 0.627 0.627 0.627
Omitted category S.D. (0.278) (0.278) (0.278) (0.278)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with access to a hygienic latrine in
the medium term (12-15 months after assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of
households. The sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received
basic health message on hygienic latrines and sanitation practices. Standard errors clustered at the village level
in parentheses. Wild cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling
at the village level, in brackets for the coefficients of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B7: Medium-term Effects: Any Latrine Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward 0.023 0.022 -0.008 -0.003
(0.026) (0.021) (0.017) (0.016)
[-0.033, 0.079] [-0.023, 0.069] [-0.043, 0.030] [-0.037, 0.033]
Reward certificate 0.029 0.029 0.008 0.009
(0.022) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016)
[-0.021, 0.074] [-0.016, 0.071] [-0.026, 0.042] [-0.025, 0.044]
Private commitment -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.010
(0.024) (0.022) (0.016) (0.016)
[-0.062, 0.040] [-0.061, 0.038] [-0.043, 0.029] [-0.043, 0.026]
Public commitment 0.015 0.008 -0.006 -0.007
(0.021) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015)
[-0.030, 0.060] [-0.030, 0.044] [-0.038, 0.025] [-0.039, 0.025]
Any latrine ownership (group share, R4) 0.587∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.048)
Share of households landless -0.153∗∗∗
(0.029)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 979 979 979 979
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.782 0.782 0.782 0.782
Omitted category S.D. (0.217) (0.217) (0.217) (0.217)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with any latrine in the medium term
(12-15 months after assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The sample
excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received basic health message
on hygienic latrines and sanitation practices. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.
Wild cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling at the village
level, in brackets for the coefficients of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B8: Medium-term Effects: Open Defecation
Based on household’s self-report
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward 0.071 0.052 0.057 0.054
(0.085) (0.060) (0.055) (0.056)
[-0.127, 0.253] [-0.091, 0.192] [-0.074, 0.184] [-0.077, 0.181]
Reward certificate 0.054 0.065 0.083 0.082
(0.069) (0.057) (0.054) (0.054)
[-0.097, 0.203] [-0.062, 0.191] [-0.045, 0.200] [-0.047, 0.201]
Private commitment 0.055 0.043 0.038 0.040
(0.064) (0.058) (0.054) (0.054)
[-0.084, 0.197] [-0.093, 0.176] [-0.096, 0.161] [-0.092, 0.166]
Public commitment -0.029 -0.014 -0.009 -0.007
(0.085) (0.062) (0.055) (0.056)
[-0.214, 0.159] [-0.151, 0.124] [-0.132, 0.116] [-0.133, 0.117]
Open defecation (group share, R4) 0.494∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.062)
Share of households landless 0.167∗∗∗
(0.041)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 979 979 979 979
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.346 0.346 0.346 0.346
Omitted category S.D. (0.318) (0.318) (0.318) (0.318)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households regularly practicing OD in the medium term (12-15
months after assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The sample
excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received basic health message
on hygienic latrines and sanitation practices. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.
Wild cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling at the village
level, in brackets for the coefficients of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B9: Medium-term Effects: Open Defecation
Based on surveyor assessment of household’s primary latrine
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward -0.011 -0.004 0.018 0.017
(0.027) (0.022) (0.016) (0.015)
[-0.068, 0.046] [-0.052, 0.045] [-0.017, 0.053] [-0.017, 0.050]
Reward certificate -0.028 -0.028 -0.001 -0.002
(0.023) (0.022) (0.013) (0.013)
[-0.076, 0.025] [-0.076, 0.022] [-0.028, 0.028] [-0.030, 0.026]
Private commitment 0.009 0.009 -0.002 -0.001
(0.026) (0.025) (0.014) (0.014)
[-0.044, 0.069] [-0.045, 0.068] [-0.032, 0.030] [-0.030, 0.030]
Public commitment -0.012 0.000 -0.009 -0.008
(0.022) (0.018) (0.011) (0.011)
[-0.056, 0.034] [-0.038, 0.039] [-0.034, 0.014] [-0.032, 0.015]
Open defecation (group share, R4) 0.552∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.052)
Share of households landless 0.060∗∗
(0.027)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 979 979 979 979
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082
Omitted category S.D. (0.188) (0.188) (0.188) (0.188)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households primarily practicing OD in the medium term (12-15
months after assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The sample
excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received basic health message
on hygienic latrines and sanitation practices. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.
Wild cluster bootstrap (9,999 repetitions, Webb weights) 95% confidence intervals, resampling at the village
level, in brackets for the coefficients of interest. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B10: Short-term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
Household-level Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward 0.102∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.033) (0.015) (0.014)
Reward certificate 0.051 0.043 0.010 0.011
(0.042) (0.035) (0.012) (0.012)
Private commitment 0.006 0.014 0.015 0.014
(0.041) (0.036) (0.011) (0.011)
Public commitment 0.056 0.061∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.036) (0.014) (0.015)
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.720∗∗∗ 0.698∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021)
Share of households landless -0.051∗∗∗
(0.017)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of households 14,447 14,447 14,447 14,447
Number of groups 980 980 980 980
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.429
Notes: the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the household owns a hygienic latrine in the short
term (at the time of assessment). The sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists
of households in groups that received the basic health messaging treatment. Standard errors clustered at the
village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B11: Medium-term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
Household-level Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward 0.042 0.054∗ 0.014 0.019
(0.036) (0.031) (0.021) (0.020)
Reward certificate 0.044 0.044 0.019 0.021
(0.039) (0.036) (0.024) (0.024)
Private commitment 0.010 0.013 0.016 0.014
(0.041) (0.039) (0.026) (0.025)
Public commitment 0.073∗∗ 0.072∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.030) (0.018) (0.018)
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.578∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.039)
Share of households landless -0.111∗∗∗
(0.030)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of households 6,284 6,284 6,284 6,284
Number of groups 979 979 979 979
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.551 0.551 0.551 0.551
Notes: the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the household owns a hygienic latrine in the medium
term (12-15 months after assessment). The sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category
consists of households in groups that received the basic health messaging treatment. Standard errors clustered
at the village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
B-13
Appendix Tables and Figures
C Interaction with Household Characteristics
Table C1: Short-term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
Household-Level Data – By Landlessness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward 0.115∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.030) (0.016) (0.016)
Monetary reward X Household landless -0.029 -0.009 -0.004 -0.009
(0.041) (0.039) (0.025) (0.025)
Reward certificate 0.056 0.047 0.016 0.015
(0.044) (0.038) (0.015) (0.015)
Reward certificate X Household landless -0.018 -0.014 -0.015 -0.017
(0.031) (0.031) (0.021) (0.021)
Private commitment -0.001 0.010 0.009 0.010
(0.045) (0.039) (0.015) (0.015)
Private commitment X Household landless -0.002 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005
(0.034) (0.036) (0.024) (0.024)
Public commitment 0.049 0.055∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.040∗∗
(0.037) (0.033) (0.017) (0.016)
Public commitment X Household landless -0.000 0.003 -0.001 0.001
(0.035) (0.035) (0.022) (0.022)
Household landless -0.215∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.026) (0.020) (0.020)
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.684∗∗∗ 0.722∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.022)
Group share landless 0.110∗∗∗
(0.019)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of households 13,417 13,417 13,417 13,417
Number of groups 980 980 980 980
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.452 0.452 0.452 0.452
Notes: the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the household owns a hygienic latrine in the short
term (at the time of assessment). The sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists
of households in groups that received the basic health messaging treatment. Standard errors clustered at the
village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table C2: Medium-term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
Household-Level Data – By Landlessness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward 0.043 0.048 0.007 0.007
(0.033) (0.031) (0.025) (0.025)
Monetary reward X Household landless 0.012 0.027 0.034 0.034
(0.040) (0.039) (0.034) (0.033)
Reward certificate 0.035 0.035 0.013 0.013
(0.039) (0.037) (0.027) (0.027)
Reward certificate X Household landless 0.029 0.027 0.023 0.022
(0.037) (0.037) (0.033) (0.033)
Private commitment 0.024 0.028 0.032 0.032
(0.040) (0.039) (0.029) (0.029)
Private commitment X Household landless -0.040 -0.042 -0.047 -0.047
(0.038) (0.039) (0.033) (0.033)
Public commitment 0.077∗∗ 0.076∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.029) (0.023) (0.023)
Public commitment X Household landless -0.031 -0.028 -0.030 -0.030
(0.043) (0.043) (0.037) (0.037)
Household landless -0.166∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030)
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.531∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.039)
Group share landless 0.012
(0.029)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of households 6,280 6,280 6,280 6,280
Number of groups 979 979 979 979
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.552 0.552 0.552 0.552
Notes: the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the household owns a hygienic latrine in the medium
term (12-15 months after assessment). The sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category
consists of households in groups that received the basic health messaging treatment. Standard errors clustered
at the village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table C3: Short-term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
Household-Level Data – By Baseline Ownership Category
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward 0.077∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.025) (0.022) (0.021)
Monetary reward X Owns non-hygienic latrine 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.010
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Monetary reward X Owns hygienic latrine -0.014 -0.018 -0.014 -0.015
(0.037) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033)
Reward certificate 0.010 0.003 -0.002 -0.001
(0.023) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017)
Reward certificate X Owns non-hygienic latrine -0.003 0.000 0.002 0.003
(0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Reward certificate X Owns hygienic latrine 0.013 0.021 0.021 0.022
(0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Private commitment -0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.023) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017)
Private commitment X Owns non-hygienic latrine 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.027
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Private commitment X Owns hygienic latrine 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.012
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
Public commitment 0.051∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.048∗∗
(0.029) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022)
Public commitment X Owns non-hygienic latrine 0.027 0.021 0.021 0.023
(0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Public commitment X Owns hygienic latrine -0.012 -0.026 -0.026 -0.024
(0.034) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029)
Owns non-hygienic latrine -0.008 -0.012 -0.014 -0.016
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Owns hygienic latrine 0.651∗∗∗ 0.642∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027)
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.129∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.023)
Share of households landless -0.059∗∗∗
(0.017)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of households 14,083 14,083 14,083 14,083
Number of groups 980 980 980 980
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.432 0.432 0.432 0.432
Notes: the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the household owns a hygienic latrine in the short
term (at the time of assessment). The sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists
of households in groups that received the basic health messaging treatment. Standard errors clustered at the
village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.C-3
Appendix Tables and Figures
Table C4: Medium-term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
Household-Level Data – By Baseline Ownership Category
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward 0.015 0.014 -0.001 0.005
(0.043) (0.037) (0.035) (0.033)
Monetary reward X Owns non-hygienic latrine 0.053 0.056 0.059 0.058
(0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041)
Monetary reward X Owns hygienic latrine 0.021 0.013 0.018 0.016
(0.044) (0.043) (0.041) (0.040)
Reward certificate 0.020 0.018 0.011 0.012
(0.040) (0.038) (0.035) (0.035)
Reward certificate X Owns non-hygienic latrine 0.002 0.009 0.012 0.013
(0.044) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041)
Reward certificate X Owns hygienic latrine 0.013 0.018 0.018 0.018
(0.043) (0.042) (0.040) (0.040)
Private commitment 0.016 0.014 0.015 0.012
(0.043) (0.042) (0.038) (0.038)
Private commitment X Owns non-hygienic latrine -0.013 -0.014 -0.009 -0.008
(0.046) (0.045) (0.043) (0.043)
Private commitment X Owns hygienic latrine 0.013 0.020 0.017 0.019
(0.047) (0.046) (0.044) (0.043)
Public commitment 0.045 0.038 0.032 0.028
(0.040) (0.036) (0.032) (0.032)
Public commitment X Owns non-hygienic latrine 0.076∗ 0.069 0.073∗ 0.076∗
(0.045) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043)
Public commitment X Owns hygienic latrine -0.001 -0.008 -0.005 -0.000
(0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.041)
Owns non-hygienic latrine -0.023 -0.029 -0.037 -0.041
(0.041) (0.039) (0.037) (0.038)
Owns hygienic latrine 0.421∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.040) (0.039) (0.038)
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.193∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.038)
Share of households landless -0.111∗∗∗
(0.028)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of households 6,168 6,168 6,168 6,168
Number of groups 979 979 979 979
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.553 0.553 0.553 0.553
Notes: the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the household owns a hygienic latrine in the medium
term (12-15 months after assessment). The sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category
consists of households in groups that received the basic health messaging treatment. Standard errors clustered
at the village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.C-4
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D Interaction with Group Characteristics
Table D1: Short Term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
Interacted with Group Share Landless
(1) (2) (3)
Monetary reward 0.109∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.030) (0.014)
Monetary reward X Share Landless -0.107 -0.050 -0.078∗
(0.091) (0.092) (0.042)
Reward certificate 0.048 0.041 0.008
(0.037) (0.033) (0.012)
Reward certificate X Share Landless -0.005 0.011 -0.034
(0.093) (0.094) (0.044)
Private commitment -0.002 0.007 0.009
(0.037) (0.033) (0.012)
Private commitment X Share Landless -0.038 -0.059 -0.053
(0.089) (0.096) (0.042)
Public commitment 0.048 0.056∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.015)
Public commitment X Share Landless -0.060 -0.042 -0.040
(0.098) (0.101) (0.046)
Group share landless -0.325∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗ -0.002
(0.077) (0.085) (0.044)
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.720∗∗∗
(0.023)
Union FEs No Yes Yes
Number of groups 980 980 980
Number of villages 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.451 0.451 0.451
Omitted category S.D. (0.189) (0.189) (0.189)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with a hygienic latrine in the short
term (at the time of assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The
sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received the basic health
messaging treatment. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table D2: Medium Term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
Interacted with Group Share Landless
(1) (2) (3)
Monetary reward 0.047 0.054∗∗ 0.014
(0.029) (0.027) (0.019)
Monetary reward X Share Landless 0.063 0.093 0.069
(0.081) (0.084) (0.060)
Reward certificate 0.043 0.041 0.017
(0.032) (0.031) (0.022)
Reward certificate X Share Landless 0.063 0.059 0.026
(0.087) (0.090) (0.066)
Private commitment 0.009 0.010 0.012
(0.034) (0.034) (0.024)
Private commitment X Share Landless -0.051 -0.070 -0.067
(0.082) (0.086) (0.057)
Public commitment 0.070∗∗ 0.073∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.018)
Public commitment X Share Landless -0.013 -0.004 -0.005
(0.093) (0.098) (0.073)
Group share landless -0.358∗∗∗ -0.317∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗
(0.072) (0.077) (0.055)
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.532∗∗∗
(0.039)
Union FEs No Yes Yes
Number of groups 979 979 979
Number of villages 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.544 0.544 0.544
Omitted category S.D. (0.255) (0.255) (0.255)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with a hygienic latrine in the medium
term (12-15 months after assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The
sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received the basic health
messaging treatment. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table D3: Short Term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
Interacted with Baseline Hygienic Latrine Ownership Share
(1) (2) (3)
Monetary reward 0.065∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.015) (0.015)
Monetary reward X Baseline share owning hyg. latr. 0.094 0.063 0.056
(0.082) (0.069) (0.065)
Reward certificate 0.009 0.007 0.008
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Reward certificate X Baseline share owning hyg. latr. -0.001 0.028 0.028
(0.057) (0.053) (0.051)
Private commitment 0.006 0.010 0.009
(0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
Private commitment X Baseline share owning hyg. latr. 0.069 0.058 0.057
(0.052) (0.055) (0.052)
Public commitment 0.046∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.040∗∗
(0.017) (0.015) (0.015)
Public commitment X Baseline share owning hyg. latr. 0.091 0.039 0.044
(0.073) (0.065) (0.061)
Baseline share owning hyg. latr. 0.720∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗ 0.663∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.057) (0.054)
Share of households landless -0.066∗∗∗
(0.018)
Union FEs No Yes Yes
Number of groups 980 980 980
Number of villages 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.451 0.451 0.451
Omitted category S.D. (0.189) (0.189) (0.189)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with a hygienic latrine in the short
term (at the time of assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The
sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received the basic health
messaging treatment. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table D4: Medium Term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
Interacted with Baseline Hygienic Latrine Ownership Share
(1) (2) (3)
Monetary reward 0.017 0.011 0.016
(0.024) (0.020) (0.020)
Monetary reward X Baseline share owning hyg. latr. 0.034 0.005 -0.005
(0.082) (0.078) (0.073)
Reward certificate 0.012 0.014 0.015
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
Reward certificate X Baseline share owning hyg. latr. 0.089 0.105 0.106
(0.078) (0.077) (0.074)
Private commitment 0.011 0.009 0.007
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
Private commitment X Baseline share owning hyg. latr. 0.046 0.077 0.076
(0.082) (0.079) (0.077)
Public commitment 0.067∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.018) (0.018)
Public commitment X Baseline share owning hyg. latr. -0.009 -0.039 -0.030
(0.081) (0.083) (0.080)
Baseline share owning hyg. latr. 0.538∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.077) (0.074)
Share of households landless -0.107∗∗∗
(0.031)
Union FEs No Yes Yes
Number of groups 979 979 979
Number of villages 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.544 0.544 0.544
Omitted category S.D. (0.255) (0.255) (0.255)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with a hygienic latrine in the medium
term (12-15 months after assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The
sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received the basic health
messaging treatment. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
D-4
Appendix Tables and Figures
Table D5: Short Term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
Interacted with Baseline Latrine Ownership Share
(1) (2) (3)
Monetary reward 0.073∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.026) (0.024)
Monetary reward X Baseline share owning any latr. 0.054 0.013 -0.002
(0.093) (0.079) (0.073)
Reward certificate 0.022 0.020 0.021
(0.026) (0.024) (0.024)
Reward certificate X Baseline share owning any latr. -0.008 0.006 0.018
(0.064) (0.056) (0.052)
Private commitment 0.004 0.011 0.008
(0.028) (0.024) (0.024)
Private commitment X Baseline share owning any latr. 0.071 0.053 0.055
(0.072) (0.062) (0.058)
Public commitment 0.042 0.047∗ 0.045
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
Public commitment X Baseline share owning any latr. 0.129 0.044 0.070
(0.081) (0.070) (0.067)
Baseline share owning any latr. 0.578∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.052) (0.049)
Share of households landless -0.192∗∗∗
(0.030)
Union FEs No Yes Yes
Number of groups 980 980 980
Number of villages 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.451 0.451 0.451
Omitted category S.D. (0.189) (0.189) (0.189)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with a hygienic latrine in the short
term (at the time of assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The
sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received the basic health
messaging treatment. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table D6: Medium Term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
Interacted with Baseline Latrine Ownership Share
(1) (2) (3)
Monetary reward 0.021 0.027 0.033
(0.028) (0.026) (0.024)
Monetary reward X Baseline share owning any latr. 0.115 0.091 0.076
(0.101) (0.098) (0.093)
Reward certificate 0.023 0.024 0.026
(0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Reward certificate X Baseline share owning any latr. 0.117 0.141 0.153∗
(0.099) (0.093) (0.089)
Private commitment 0.009 0.008 0.005
(0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
Private commitment X Baseline share owning any latr. 0.014 0.012 0.014
(0.106) (0.103) (0.100)
Public commitment 0.061∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗
(0.024) (0.023) (0.022)
Public commitment X Baseline share owning any latr. 0.084 0.030 0.055
(0.086) (0.086) (0.080)
Baseline share owning any latr. 0.428∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.078) (0.075)
Share of households landless -0.190∗∗∗
(0.035)
Union FEs No Yes Yes
Number of groups 979 979 979
Number of villages 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.544 0.544 0.544
Omitted category S.D. (0.255) (0.255) (0.255)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with a hygienic latrine in the medium
term (12-15 months after assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The
sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received the basic health
messaging treatment. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table D7: Short Term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
Interacted with Baseline Non-Hygienic Latrine Ownership Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward 0.098∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.030) (0.028) (0.015)
Monetary reward X Baseline share owning non-hyg. latr. -0.254∗ -0.215∗ -0.167 -0.127
(0.144) (0.123) (0.106) (0.079)
Reward certificate 0.045 0.038 0.037 0.009
(0.038) (0.032) (0.030) (0.012)
Reward certificate X Baseline share owning non-hyg. latr. -0.227 -0.226 -0.176 -0.113
(0.143) (0.137) (0.121) (0.068)
Private commitment 0.001 0.010 0.007 0.011
(0.038) (0.033) (0.030) (0.012)
Private commitment X Baseline share owning non-hyg. latr. -0.029 0.014 0.015 0.014
(0.138) (0.126) (0.112) (0.072)
Public commitment 0.060 0.061∗ 0.057∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.031) (0.030) (0.015)
Public commitment X Baseline share owning non-hyg. latr. -0.115 -0.082 -0.049 -0.008
(0.121) (0.092) (0.089) (0.064)
Baseline share owning non-hyg. latr. -0.258∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗ -0.251∗∗∗ 0.103
(0.095) (0.084) (0.080) (0.067)
Share of households landless -0.287∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.018)
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.729∗∗∗
(0.026)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 980 980 980 980
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.451 0.451 0.451 0.451
Omitted category S.D. (0.189) (0.189) (0.189) (0.189)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with a hygienic latrine in the short
term (at the time of assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The
sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received the basic health
messaging treatment. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table D8: Medium Term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
Interacted with Baseline Non-Hygienic Latrine Ownership Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward 0.040 0.047∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.015
(0.035) (0.028) (0.026) (0.019)
Monetary reward X Baseline share owning non-hyg. latr. -0.013 0.036 0.077 0.109
(0.142) (0.142) (0.128) (0.113)
Reward certificate 0.040 0.038 0.038 0.016
(0.035) (0.032) (0.030) (0.022)
Reward certificate X Baseline share owning non-hyg. latr. -0.176 -0.138 -0.088 -0.040
(0.144) (0.140) (0.129) (0.107)
Private commitment 0.009 0.010 0.007 0.010
(0.037) (0.035) (0.032) (0.024)
Private commitment X Baseline share owning non-hyg. latr. -0.096 -0.114 -0.112 -0.113
(0.133) (0.130) (0.110) (0.099)
Public commitment 0.078∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.026) (0.026) (0.018)
Public commitment X Baseline share owning non-hyg. latr. 0.041 0.048 0.075 0.107
(0.144) (0.130) (0.130) (0.106)
Baseline share owning non-hyg. latr. -0.175 -0.189∗ -0.174∗ 0.101
(0.110) (0.105) (0.096) (0.099)
Share of households landless -0.280∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.033)
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.566∗∗∗
(0.045)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 979 979 979 979
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.544 0.544 0.544 0.544
Omitted category S.D. (0.255) (0.255) (0.255) (0.255)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with a hygienic latrine in the medium
term (12-15 months after assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The
sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received the basic health
messaging treatment. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table D9: Short Term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
Interacted with Village Leader Present
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward 0.115∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.039) (0.034) (0.015)
Monetary reward X Village Leader Present in Group -0.086 -0.094∗ -0.106∗∗ -0.073∗∗
(0.059) (0.053) (0.049) (0.034)
Reward certificate 0.069 0.057 0.055 0.020
(0.047) (0.040) (0.036) (0.012)
Reward certificate X Village Leader Present in Group -0.104∗∗ -0.089∗∗ -0.078∗ -0.059∗∗
(0.051) (0.044) (0.041) (0.026)
Private commitment 0.015 0.018 0.014 0.012
(0.046) (0.040) (0.036) (0.012)
Private commitment X Village Leader Present in Group -0.078∗ -0.044 -0.044 -0.014
(0.046) (0.042) (0.040) (0.029)
Public commitment 0.052 0.057 0.050 0.034∗∗
(0.045) (0.041) (0.038) (0.015)
Public commitment X Village Leader Present in Group -0.004 0.002 0.012 0.027
(0.051) (0.046) (0.043) (0.030)
Village Leader Present in Group 0.112∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.030
(0.039) (0.038) (0.034) (0.026)
Share of households landless -0.321∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.017)
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.718∗∗∗
(0.023)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 980 980 980 980
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.451 0.451 0.451 0.451
Omitted category S.D. (0.189) (0.189) (0.189) (0.189)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with a hygienic latrine in the short
term (at the time of assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The
sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received the basic health
messaging treatment. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table D10: Medium Term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
Interacted with Village Leader Present
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward 0.054 0.066∗∗ 0.073∗∗ 0.028
(0.040) (0.033) (0.029) (0.020)
Monetary reward X Village Leader Present in Group -0.083 -0.084 -0.094∗∗ -0.070
(0.052) (0.051) (0.047) (0.044)
Reward certificate 0.059 0.056 0.054 0.028
(0.041) (0.037) (0.033) (0.023)
Reward certificate X Village Leader Present in Group -0.093∗ -0.085 -0.076 -0.062
(0.053) (0.053) (0.048) (0.046)
Private commitment 0.015 0.013 0.009 0.008
(0.042) (0.040) (0.035) (0.024)
Private commitment X Village Leader Present in Group -0.023 -0.002 -0.002 0.021
(0.050) (0.051) (0.049) (0.044)
Public commitment 0.072∗∗ 0.072∗∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.031) (0.030) (0.018)
Public commitment X Village Leader Present in Group -0.005 0.004 0.013 0.025
(0.053) (0.051) (0.047) (0.046)
Village Leader Present in Group 0.086∗ 0.073 0.050 0.016
(0.049) (0.050) (0.044) (0.046)
Share of households landless -0.296∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.032)
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.533∗∗∗
(0.039)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 979 979 979 979
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.544 0.544 0.544 0.544
Omitted category S.D. (0.255) (0.255) (0.255) (0.255)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with a hygienic latrine in the medium
term (12-15 months after assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The
sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received the basic health
messaging treatment. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table D11: Short Term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
Interacted with Group Size (Number of Households)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward 0.101∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.035) (0.015) (0.015)
Monetary reward X Num. HH in group 0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002
(0.010) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004)
Reward certificate 0.057 0.047 0.010 0.011
(0.046) (0.040) (0.013) (0.012)
Reward certificate X Num. HH in group -0.009 -0.008 -0.002 -0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
Private commitment 0.004 0.014 0.013 0.011
(0.044) (0.039) (0.012) (0.012)
Private commitment X Num. HH in group -0.012 -0.010 -0.005 -0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
Public commitment 0.053 0.063 0.042∗∗ 0.041∗∗
(0.042) (0.038) (0.017) (0.016)
Public commitment X Num. HH in group -0.003 -0.007 0.000 0.000
(0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Num. HH in group 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.002
(0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.747∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023)
Share of households landless -0.066∗∗∗
(0.017)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 980 980 980 980
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.451 0.451 0.451 0.451
Omitted category S.D. (0.189) (0.189) (0.189) (0.189)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with a hygienic latrine in the short
term (at the time of assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The
sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received the basic health
messaging treatment. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table D12: Medium Term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
Interacted with Group Size (Number of Households)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward 0.043 0.056∗ 0.014 0.017
(0.036) (0.031) (0.019) (0.019)
Monetary reward X Num. HH in group 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
Reward certificate 0.048 0.045 0.016 0.018
(0.041) (0.039) (0.024) (0.023)
Reward certificate X Num. HH in group -0.008 -0.007 -0.002 -0.002
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Private commitment 0.016 0.018 0.017 0.015
(0.041) (0.040) (0.025) (0.024)
Private commitment X Num. HH in group -0.013∗ -0.011 -0.008 -0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Public commitment 0.078∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.029) (0.017) (0.018)
Public commitment X Num. HH in group -0.010 -0.012∗ -0.006 -0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Num. HH in group 0.014∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.009 0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.576∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.039)
Share of households landless -0.104∗∗∗
(0.032)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 979 979 979 979
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.544 0.544 0.544 0.544
Omitted category S.D. (0.255) (0.255) (0.255) (0.255)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with a hygienic latrine in the medium
term (12-15 months after assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The
sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received the basic health
messaging treatment. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table D13: Short Term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
Interacted with Group Density
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward 0.104∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.033) (0.015) (0.015)
Monetary reward X Group density 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Reward certificate 0.047 0.041 0.008 0.009
(0.042) (0.035) (0.012) (0.012)
Reward certificate X Group density -0.006∗ -0.004 -0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Private commitment -0.000 0.009 0.010 0.009
(0.043) (0.038) (0.012) (0.012)
Private commitment X Group density -0.007∗∗ -0.006∗ -0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Public commitment 0.056 0.062∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.035) (0.015) (0.015)
Public commitment X Group density 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Group density 0.007∗∗ 0.004 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.744∗∗∗ 0.717∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023)
Share of households landless -0.065∗∗∗
(0.017)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 980 980 980 980
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.451 0.451 0.451 0.451
Omitted category S.D. (0.189) (0.189) (0.189) (0.189)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with a hygienic latrine in the short
term (at the time of assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The
sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received the basic health
messaging treatment. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table D14: Medium Term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
Interacted with Group Density
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward 0.043 0.053∗ 0.010 0.014
(0.034) (0.030) (0.019) (0.019)
Monetary reward X Group density 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Reward certificate 0.043 0.042 0.016 0.018
(0.038) (0.035) (0.023) (0.023)
Reward certificate X Group density -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Private commitment 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.010
(0.041) (0.039) (0.025) (0.024)
Private commitment X Group density -0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Public commitment 0.074∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.028) (0.018) (0.018)
Public commitment X Group density 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Group density 0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.580∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.039)
Share of households landless -0.110∗∗∗
(0.031)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 979 979 979 979
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.544 0.544 0.544 0.544
Omitted category S.D. (0.255) (0.255) (0.255) (0.255)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with a hygienic latrine in the medium
term (12-15 months after assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The
sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received the basic health
messaging treatment. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table D15: Short Term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
Interacted with Maximum eigenvalue of adjacency matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward 0.096∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.035) (0.015) (0.014)
Monetary reward X Max. eigval. of adj. matrix 0.003 0.004 -0.010 -0.009
(0.018) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008)
Reward certificate 0.049 0.040 0.008 0.009
(0.043) (0.037) (0.012) (0.012)
Reward certificate X Max. eigval. of adj. matrix 0.010 0.008 0.001 0.002
(0.014) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007)
Private commitment 0.003 0.012 0.011 0.011
(0.042) (0.038) (0.012) (0.012)
Private commitment X Max. eigval. of adj. matrix -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.007
(0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006)
Public commitment 0.059 0.063∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.035) (0.015) (0.015)
Public commitment X Max. eigval. of adj. matrix -0.011 -0.009 -0.005 -0.005
(0.017) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008)
Max. eigval. of adj. matrix -0.018 -0.006 0.000 -0.001
(0.011) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006)
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.746∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023)
Share of households landless -0.065∗∗∗
(0.017)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 978 978 978 978
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.451 0.451 0.451 0.451
Omitted category S.D. (0.189) (0.189) (0.189) (0.189)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with a hygienic latrine in the short
term (at the time of assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The
sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received the basic health
messaging treatment. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table D16: Medium Term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
Interacted with Maximum eigenvalue of adjacency matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward 0.041 0.055∗ 0.014 0.019
(0.036) (0.030) (0.018) (0.018)
Monetary reward X Max. eigval. of adj. matrix -0.009 -0.009 -0.019 -0.017
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Reward certificate 0.045 0.043 0.018 0.019
(0.038) (0.035) (0.022) (0.021)
Reward certificate X Max. eigval. of adj. matrix -0.009 -0.012 -0.017∗ -0.016∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
Private commitment 0.011 0.013 0.012 0.011
(0.040) (0.038) (0.023) (0.023)
Private commitment X Max. eigval. of adj. matrix -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.004
(0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
Public commitment 0.075∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.028) (0.017) (0.017)
Public commitment X Max. eigval. of adj. matrix -0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005
(0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
Max. eigval. of adj. matrix 0.003 0.012 0.016∗∗ 0.015∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008)
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.580∗∗∗ 0.536∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.039)
Share of households landless -0.106∗∗∗
(0.032)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 977 977 977 977
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.544 0.544 0.544 0.544
Omitted category S.D. (0.255) (0.255) (0.255) (0.255)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with a hygienic latrine in the medium
term (12-15 months after assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The
sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received the basic health
messaging treatment. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
D-16
Appendix Tables and Figures
Table D17: Short Term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
Interacted with Second eigenvalue of stochastized adjacency matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward 0.100∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.035) (0.015) (0.015)
Monetary reward X Second eignval. of stoch. adj. matrix 0.007 0.017 -0.050∗∗ -0.048∗∗
(0.036) (0.037) (0.022) (0.023)
Reward certificate 0.051 0.041 0.008 0.009
(0.044) (0.037) (0.013) (0.012)
Reward certificate X Second eignval. of stoch. adj. matrix 0.002 0.015 -0.010 -0.010
(0.025) (0.022) (0.016) (0.016)
Private commitment 0.002 0.011 0.012 0.011
(0.045) (0.039) (0.012) (0.012)
Private commitment X Second eignval. of stoch. adj. matrix 0.011 0.007 -0.007 -0.007
(0.025) (0.025) (0.016) (0.017)
Public commitment 0.056 0.063∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.037) (0.015) (0.015)
Public commitment X Second eignval. of stoch. adj. matrix 0.017 -0.013 -0.005 -0.003
(0.034) (0.030) (0.022) (0.022)
Second eignval. of stoch. adj. matrix 0.004 -0.001 0.024 0.022
(0.021) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018)
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.749∗∗∗ 0.722∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023)
Share of households landless -0.065∗∗∗
(0.018)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 978 978 978 978
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.451 0.451 0.451 0.451
Omitted category S.D. (0.189) (0.189) (0.189) (0.189)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with a hygienic latrine in the short
term (at the time of assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The
sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received the basic health
messaging treatment. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Appendix Tables and Figures
Table D18: Medium Term Effects: Hygienic Latrine Ownership
Interacted with Second eigenvalue of stochastized adjacency matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary reward 0.039 0.051∗ 0.010 0.015
(0.036) (0.030) (0.019) (0.019)
Monetary reward X Second eignval. of stoch. adj. matrix 0.030 0.039 -0.012 -0.008
(0.040) (0.036) (0.034) (0.035)
Reward certificate 0.044 0.041 0.015 0.017
(0.039) (0.035) (0.023) (0.022)
Reward certificate X Second eignval. of stoch. adj. matrix 0.018 0.025 0.005 0.007
(0.032) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
Private commitment 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.012
(0.041) (0.039) (0.025) (0.024)
Private commitment X Second eignval. of stoch. adj. matrix 0.001 -0.001 -0.012 -0.012
(0.031) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027)
Public commitment 0.075∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.029) (0.018) (0.018)
Public commitment X Second eignval. of stoch. adj. matrix 0.013 0.002 0.009 0.013
(0.037) (0.034) (0.033) (0.032)
Second eignval. of stoch. adj. matrix 0.006 0.001 0.020 0.017
(0.028) (0.025) (0.020) (0.020)
Baseline share owning hyg. lat. 0.577∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.039)
Share of households landless -0.107∗∗∗
(0.032)
Union FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 977 977 977 977
Number of villages 84 84 84 84
Omitted category mean 0.544 0.544 0.544 0.544
Omitted category S.D. (0.255) (0.255) (0.255) (0.255)
Notes: the dependent variable is the share of households in the group with a hygienic latrine in the medium
term (12-15 months after assessment). Observations (groups) are weighted by the number of households. The
sample excludes pure control villages, so the omitted category consists of groups that received the basic health
messaging treatment. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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∗Email: m.bakhtiar@cgiar.org, rpguiter@ncsu.edu, james.levinsohn@yale.edu,
ahmed.mobarak@yale.edu.
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SM1 Outcome Variables
Here, we provide detail on how our outcome variables are constructed from our survey




Survey Section 1, Q4, “What kind of facility is the latrine most regularly used (primary
latrine) by the household?” Surveyor observes facility. Response 01 “Don’t have any
latrine / Open defecation” or 02 “Hanging latrine” coded as open defection.
Because the short-term data collection was part of the assessment for rewards, self-report
of open defecation was especially likely to be biased by treatment arm. Therefore, in
this survey round, we use only OD as inferred from the surveyor’s assessment of the
facility the household reports as its primary latrine or defecation site.
• Any Latrine Access:
Survey Section 1, Q4, “What kind of facility is the latrine most regularly used (primary
latrine) by the household?” Surveyor observes facility. Response 01 “Don’t have any
latrine / Open defecation” or 02 “Hanging latrine” coded as not having access to a
latrine, while any other response for this question - ranging from Response 03 “Open
Pit/hole without slab and lid or cover” to Response 17 “Sanitary latrine with septic
tank” - was coded as having access to a latrine.
• Any Latrine Ownership:
Latrine ownership is defined as the sole or joint ownership of the household’s primary
latrine facility. Ownership is a strict subset of access – households without access to a
latrine are coded as not owning a latrine facility.
Survey Section 1, Q5, “What is the ownership status of the primary latrine? CODE:
01=Toilet jointly owned with another household, 02=Toilet solely owned by household,
03=community toilet, 04=owned by others/neighbor”. Response 01 or Response 02 was
coded as owning a latrine, while any other response was coded as not owning a latrine
facility.
• Hygienic Latrine Access:
A latrine that a household has access to (see above) is classified as hygienic if satisfies
all three of the following criteria, which attempt to capture whether the latrine safely
separates feces from the environment: (1) has an intact and functional slab; (2) has an
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intact and functional water seal; and (3) does not have any observable leak from the
pit or any other latrine component (such as the pipe or Y-junction).
Whether a latrine has an intact and functional slab is based on two questions. The first
is Section 1, Q24, “Type of the latrine slab CODE: 00=No slab, 01=Concrete/cement,
02=Plastic, 03=Bamboo, 04=Brick, 05=Earthen, 06=Others”. The second is Section
1, Q25, “What is the current condition of latrine slab? CODE: 01=Fully Intact,
02=Partially Broken, 03=Completely Broken”. Response 00 for Q24 or Responses 02
or 03 for Q25 leads a latrine to be coded to not have a functional slab.
Whether a latrine has an intact and functional water seal is based on two questions.
The first is Section 1, Q27, “What is the current condition of the water seal? CODE:
01=Fully Intact, 02=Partially Broken, 03=Completely Broken, 04=No water seal”. A
latrine is coded to have a functional/intact water seal with Response 01 to this question.
On the other hand, a latrine is coded to not have a functional water seal for Responses
02, 03 and 04. The second is Section 1, Q4, “What kind of facility is the latrine most
regularly used (primary latrine) by the household?” Response 01 “Don’t have any
latrine / Open defecation” or 02 “Hanging latrine” or 03 “Open Pit/hole without slab
and lid or cover”, as well as 08 “Ring-slab latrine (direct) with water seal:broken/none”
or 11 “Single pit ring-slab latrine (Offset) with water seal: broken” or 14 “Double pit
Ring-slab latrine (Offset) with water seal: broken”, leads a latrine to be coded to not
have a functional water seal.
Whether a latrine has components without any observed leaks is based on three questions.
The first is Section 1, Q19a “(OBSERVE) Is there any leakage of the latrine pipe, Y
junction, pit or the tank? Code: 01=Major, 02=Minor, 03=No leak”. A response of
01 or 02 for this question leads a latrine to be coded to have a leaking component.
The second is Section 1, Q18, “Is the latrine pipe linked to any ditch/canal/pond etc.?
CODE: 01=Yes, 02=No”. A response of 01 for this question leads a latrine to be coded
to have a leaking component. The third is Section 1, Q4 is also used “What kind
of facility is the latrine most regularly used (primary latrine) by the household?” .
Response 01 “Don’t have any latrine / Open defecation” or 02 “Hanging latrine” or
“03. Open Pit/hole without slab and lid or cover” leads a latrine to be coded to have a
leaking component.
• Hygienic Latrine Ownership:
Hygienic latrine ownership is defined as the sole or joint ownership of a hygienic latrine
facility a household has access to. Hygienic ownership is a strict subset of hygienic
access – households without access to any latrine or a hygienic latrine are coded as not
owning a hygienic latrine.
Survey Section 1, Q5, “What is the ownership status of the primary latrine? CODE:
01=Toilet jointly owned with another household, 02=Toilet solely owned by household,
03=community toilet, 04=owned by others/neighbor”. If a household has access to a
hygienic latrine (see above), Response 01 or Response 02 is then coded as owning a
hygienic latrine, while any other response was coded as not owning a hygienic latrine
facility.
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Medium-term outcomes
The medium-term outcomes are defined identically to those collected in the short term, except
for household self-reported open defecation, which was not collected in the short term. There
are slight differences in question and response numbering, so we include the definitions below
in spite of the redundancy.
• Open defecation: Survey Section H, Q12, “What kind of facility is the latrine most
regularly used (primary latrine) by the household?” Surveyor observes facility. Response
01 “Don’t have any latrine / Open defecation” or 02 “Hanging latrine” coded as open
defection.
• Open defecation among adults (household self-report): Survey Section H, Q7, “Do
(adult men, adult women, children) use open spaces / bushes / hanging latrines for
defecation?” Coded Yes if respondent answered Yes (01) for adult men or adult women.
This measure was not collected in the short-term survey, since open defecation was
connected to rewards and response bias would therefore likely be correlated with
treatment.
• Any Latrine Access:
Survey Section H-1, Q13, “What kind of facility is the latrine most regularly used
(primary latrine) by the household?” Surveyor observes facility. Response 01 “Don’t
have any latrine / Open defecation” or 02 “Hanging latrine” coded as not having access
to a latrine, while any other response for this question - ranging from Response 03
“Open Pit/hole without slab and lid or cover” to Response 17 “Sanitary latrine with
septic tank” - was coded as having access to a latrine.
• Any Latrine Ownership:
Latrine ownership is a strict subset of latrine access and is defined as the sole or joint
ownership of the latrine facility a household has access to.
Section H-1, Q18, “What is the ownership status of the primary latrine? CODE:
01=Toilet jointly owned with another household, 02=Toilet solely owned by household,
03= Other’s toilet”. Response 01 or Response 02 was coded as owning a latrine, while
any other response was coded as not owning a latrine facility. Not having access to a
latrine is also coded as not owning a latrine facility.
• Hygienic Latrine Access:
A latrine that a household has access to (see above) is classified as hygienic if satisfies
all three of the following criteria: (1) has an intact and functional slab; (2) has an
intact and functional water seal; and (3) does not have any observable leak from the
pit or any other latrine component (such as the pipe or Y-junction).
Whether a latrine has an intact and functional slab is based on two questions. The first
is Section H-1, Q46, “Type of the latrine slab CODE: 00=No slab, 01=Concrete/cement,
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02=Plastic, 03=Bamboo, 04=Brick, 05=Earthen, 06=Others”. The second is Section
H-1, Q47, “What is the current condition of latrine slab? CODE: 01=Fully Intact,
02=Partially Broken, 03=Completely Broken”. Response 00 for Q24 or Responses 02 or
03 for Q25 leads a latrine to be coded to not have a functional slab. Not having access
to a latrine also leads this variable to be coded as zero.
Whether a latrine has an intact and functional water seal is based on two questions.
The first is Section H-1, Q50, “What is the current condition of the water seal? CODE:
01=Fully Intact, 02=Partially Broken, 03=Completely Broken, 04=No water seal”. A
latrine is coded to have a functional/intact water seal with Response 01 to this question.
On the other hand, a latrine is coded to not have a functional water seal for Responses
02, 03 and 04. The second is Section H-1, Q13, “What kind of facility is the latrine
most regularly used (primary latrine) by the household?” Response 01 “Don’t have any
latrine / Open defecation” or 02 “Hanging latrine” or 03 “Open Pit/hole without slab
and lid or cover”, as well as 08 “Ring-slab latrine (direct) with water seal:broken/none”
or 11 “Single pit ring-slab latrine (Offset) with water seal: broken” or 14 “Double pit
Ring-slab latrine (Offset) with water seal: broken”, leads a latrine to be coded to not
have a functional water seal.
Whether a latrine has functional components without any observed leaks is based on
three questions. The first is Section H-1, Q36a, “(OBSERVE) Is there any leakage of
the latrine pipe, Y junction, pit or the tank? Code: 01=Major, 02=Minor, 03=No
leak”. A response of 01 or 02 for this question leads a latrine to be coded to have a
leaking component. The second is Section H-1, Q35, “Is the latrine pipe linked to any
ditch/canal/pond etc.? CODE: 01=Yes, 02=No”. A response of 01 for this question
leads a latrine to be coded to have a leaking component. The third is Survey Section
H-1, Q13, “What kind of facility is the latrine most regularly used (primary latrine)
by the household?” Response 01 “Don’t have any latrine / Open defecation” or 02
“Hanging latrine” or “03. Open Pit/hole without slab and lid or cover” leads a latrine
to be coded to have a leaking component.
• Hygienic Latrine Ownership:
Hygienic latrine ownership is defined as the sole or joint ownership of a hygienic latrine
facility a household has access to. Hygienic ownership is a strict subset of hygienic
access – households without access to any latrine or a hygienic latrine are coded as not
owning a hygienic latrine.
Section H-1, Q18, “What is the ownership status of the primary latrine? CODE:
01=Toilet jointly owned with another household, 02=Toilet solely owned by household,
03= Other’s toilet”. If a household has access to a hygienic latrine (see above), Response
01 or Response 02 is then coded as owning a hygienic latrine, while any other response
was coded as not owning a hygienic latrine facility.
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Group shares
In all cases, group shares are the fraction of households surveyed in the group in the
corresponding category. As discussed in Section 4 of the main text, the endline survey was
conducted with a 50% subsample stratified by village, leading to some imbalance in the
number of households surveyed per group. For groups with fewer than 6 households selected
for the endline survey, we randomly selected a “top-up” sample from the remaining households
and conducted a brief followup consisting of the endline’s modules on latrine condition and
use.
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SM2 Group Formation
As noted in Section 2, the sample consisted of households living in villages that were part
of the previous demand study. In that study, villages were subdivided into neighborhoods,
and that first set of interventions was conducted at the neighborhood level.1 The median
number of households per neighborhood was 40 (IQR 26-56), and the median number of
neighborhoods per village was 4 (IQR 2-6).
For this study, a somewhat smaller intervention unit was appropriate because our fieldwork
and qualitative background-information gathering suggested that having households making
public commitments to smaller groups of immediate neighbors was more sensible, and that
there would be less free-riding and meeting non-attendance in smaller groups. Therefore, we
further divided neighborhoods into “groups”: sets of 15-20 roughly contiguous households
within the neighborhood.
The intervention supervisors who had also been involved with the first set of interventions –
the “demand study interventions” – were tasked with the process of assigning households to
groups. Because of their long stay in the survey area, the supervisors had developed a close
understanding of the socio-dynamics of the sample. This helped them form groups without
breaking any organic link between clusters of households in a neighborhood. The general
instructions for constructing groups were:
1. Groups should consist of around 15 continuous / neighboring households;
2. Groups should generally not exceed 20 households
Generally, natural divisions such as rivers or open space between households were used to
assign households into simple, contiguous groups. However, some exceptions were made based
on practical constraints, in particular when:
1. Households were located in isolated places. If the number of such isolated households
was too few to form their own group (say, only 1-2 households) they were added to the
nearest group. On the other hand, if the number of such nearby households was higher
but still less than 15, these households were put together to form a group. Ultimately,
only 6 groups of less than 10 households were formed.
2. At the other extreme, sometimes households were very densely packed and it proved
difficult to separate them meaningfully into discrete groups. The largest group in the
study area consists of 33 households. Ultimately, only 3 groups consisted of more than
23 households.
1The neighborhood, or para in Bangla, is not a formal or official designation, but unofficial neighborhood
boundaries were usually common knowledge in the community, and in these cases we followed local convention.
If there were not well-defined neighborhoods in a village, or if a neighborhood needed to be divided because
of its size, we used natural divisions such as rivers or roads where such existed. If such natural pre-existing
divisions did not exist or were not practical, we created “neighborhoods” (for the purpose of the study) of
households in simple, contiguous sets.
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Followup-02/Final Cluster Meeting Training Manual 
Step-01: On the day before the cluster meeting, the selected leader will be called on mobile so that s/he tells all 
other members to be present at the meeting on time.  
Step-02: After reaching a cluster, at first the Health Motivator will go to each house of the cluster, exchange 
greetings and invite them to join the meeting at a selected place. Then s/he will inspect the household’s latrine/s 
and collect the information on the electronic tabs. If the latrine is unhygienic (based on the criteria listed below) 
then it must be explained to the household what steps they need to take in order to make the latrine hygienic.  
Notes for data collection: 
1. Information has to be entered for hanging latrines
2. If latrine code is 03 then the response to Question 6 is 05/NA
3. If the latrine code is 08 and there is no evidence of feces lumps , then the response to Question 6 will be
04 or ‘No fecal matter seen’
4. For hanging latrine (leaking latrine) even if the condition of the ring and pit cover is good, the response












What kind of facility 
is the primary 
latrine used by the 
household?
1
How many other households share this latrine facility? 
What is the current condition of latrine slab? CODE: 01=Fully Intact, 02=Partially Broken, 03=Completely Broken, 04=No slab, 05=N/A
What is the current condition of the water seal? CODE: 01=Fully Intact, 02=Partially Broken, 03=Completely Broken, 04= No 
Water Seal, 05=N/A
08. Ring-slab latrine (direct) with water seal: broken/none 17. Sanitary latrine with septic tank
09. Ring-slab latrine (direct) with flip/ pollythene |___|___|
06. Modern pit latrine with vent pipe 15. Double pit Ring-slab latrine (Offset) with flip/ pollythene
07. Ring-slab latrine (direct) with water seal: intact 16. Eco Latrine
12. Single pit Ring-slab latrine (Offset) with flip/ pollythene
04. Pit latrine with slab but without lid or cover 13. Double pit Ring-slab latrine (Offset) with water seal: intact
05. Pit latrine with cover 14. Double pit Ring-slab latrine (Offset) with water seal: broken
Are there rings in the latrine pit?  CODE: 01=Sufficient no. of Rings, 02=Insufficient No. of Rings, 03=No rings, 05=N/A
NOTE: Please ask the follow questions on the primary latrine which is the toilet facility that is used by the household members the 
majority of the time at the period during which the survey is being conducted.
(If offset) What is the current condition of pit cover? CODE: 01=Fully Intact, 02=Partially Broken, 03=Completely Broken, 04= 
No Pit Cover, 05=N/A
(If offset) What is the current condition of delivery pipe? CODE: 01=Fully Intact, 02=Partially Broken, 03=Completely Broken, 
04= No Delivery Pipe, 05=N/A
Is there any visual evidence of lumps of feces in the toilet area? (does not apply for traces or floating fecal matter) CODE: 01 = On 
Pan; 02 = On Slab, 03 = On both Pan and slab, 04 =No fecal matter seen, 05=N/A
Where is the primary latrine located? CODE: 01=In own homestead (attached), 02=Outside own homestead (not attached), 
03=Community latrine, 04=Another household/neighbor's latrine, 05=open defecation
What is the ownership status of the primary latrine? CODE: 01=Toilet jointly owned/shared with another household, 02=private toilet 
solely owned by household, 03=community toilet, 04=uses someone else's latrine, 05=open spaces/bushes/hanging latrine
01. Don’t have any latrine/Open defecation 10. Single pit Ring-slab latrine (Offset) with water seal: intact
02. Hanging latrine 11. Single pit ring-slab latrine (Offset) with water seal: broken
03. Open Pit/hole without slab and lid or cover
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5. Need to explain to the household that visible fecal matter makes the latrine unhygienic
6. We will also monitor rings to determine hygienic status – this should be explained
7. If the pit doesn’t have sufficient number of rings, the latrine will be deemed unhygienic
Step-03: The meeting will start only when three-fourth of all the members of the cluster are present. The 
meeting will start by giving thanks to everyone. Everyone will introduce her/himself. 
Step-04: Discussion on working as a group: 
A. Purpose behind forming groups and solving a problem collectively:
• Unhygienic latrine - feces will be visible, spread bad smell and exposed to flies and insects.
Extensive discussion later.
• Unhygienic latrines and unhygienic practices are a social/collective problem. If someone has an
unhygienic latrine then it will adversely impact others as well.  For example - (pointing finger to
someone from the group) “Because of your unhygienic latrine someone else/someone else’s
children (pointing fingers to someone else) might get sick with cholera, typhoid, diarrhea,
jaundice and polio. It is likely to bring economic, physical loss to you and your children.”
• For this reason having hygienic latrine for one’s own household is not enough, neighbors must
have hygienic latrines as well.
• “Whose problem is this? Is this your problem? Does this problem need to be solved in a
collective manner?” Because of the enormity of this problem, it needs to be solved in a collective
manner.
• “Unity is strength” (Similar Bangla phrases to put emphasis on group work)
B. Read out the names of the members of the group and put emphasis on the importance of spreading the
information to those who are absent.
Step-05: Health Motivators will start the discussion on the topics detailed below. Characteristics of a hygienic 
latrine needs to be repeated as many times as required. Discussion on what is on this script must end within 10-
12 minutes.  
A. DEFINITION, CHARACTERISTICS AND USE OF HYGIENIC LATRINES
Broad definition of hygienic latrine 
1. Hygienic latrines limit the spread of diseases caused by water/feces and keep the environment
pollution free.
2. Feces is enclosed in one place and it can not be seen from outside.
3. Flies or other insects cannot enter into the pit.
Most Important technical characteristics of a hygienic latrine: 
(These are the characteristics which form the basis for judging if a latrine is hygienic or not. 
Repeat these characterisitcs often in the cluster meeting so that particiapnts can internalize 
these attributes.) 
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1. There must be a slab and it cannot be broken.
2. There must be a water-seal (gooseneck or siphon) and it cannot be broken.
3. There must be an adequate number of rings depending upon the depth of the well and those must not
be broken.
4. There should be no gap between the cover of the slab and ring or between the ring and pit cover.
5. There should be no feces, flies or bad smell in or around the latrine.
6. Delivery pipe, y-junction, pit cover cannot be broken.
7. The latrine cannot be connected to a lake or any enclosed water body/ environment cannot be polluted.
8. There should be earth/cement moulded around the slab in case of direct pit latrines.
(Try to get these characteristics repeated by some of the participants) 
Methods of using a hygienic latrine: 
1. The pan should be made wet by using little water before each use. Feces will not stick on the pan if
this is done
2. 1-2 pots (few liters) of water should be used after using the latrine
3. No solid object (like- stone, cloth, mud) should be thrown into the pan
4. The pan of the latrine and the slab/floor must be cleaned everyday.
5. If the latrine pit becomes full than another latrine must be built or the pit must be emptied.
B. Discuss about the number of hygienic/unhygienic latrines among the cluster members and their current
condition. Disucuss what must be done to turn the current unhygienic latrines of the clusters into hygienic ones.
C. Targeted number of latrines, deadline and rewards (where applicable) as set by the office must be repeated
infront of everybody present so that they can understand it clearly. Make sure that everyone has understood it by
asking one or two of them.
D. Motivate each of the households to create and maintain separate hygienic latrine. It must be ensured that they
understand that only one household will be rewarded (where applicable) for one hygienic latrine.
[Note: Cluster meeting participants cannot be shamed. During household latrine visit if the latrine is found to be 
unhygienic then the Health Motivator must explain the resaons as to why the latrine is unhygienic. But during the 
meeting the household member can never be pointed out and shamed. If any household member present in the 
meeting asks something about her latrine then her questions must be answered while visiting her home at the end 
of the meeting. However, if any participant asks a question which is applicable for all the participants then that 
answer can be given in front of everyone. For example if someone asks, “I have not built a separate cover for my 
offset latrine. But I have covered it up nicely with a carpet (chatai in Bangla). Is this hygienic?” answer to this sort 
of questions can be given in front of all the participants as everyone needs to know about this.] 
Step-06: Like the initial meeting, the Health Motivator will conduct a group commitment session (for public 
commitment intervention) where people will commit to achieve the target. In case of private commitment, the 
Health Motivators will go to each household separately and make people commit privately.  
Commitment 
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Public Commitment: During each cluster meeting, members from all the households of a cluster will commit 
publicly that those who do not yet have hygienic latrines will meet hygienic latrine standards as set by the project. 
Those with hygienic latrines would promise that they would help others reaching the goal within the time limit 
set by the project. The script of the pledge is as follows: 
“I hereby promise before everyone present that I will do my best to set up hygienic latrines or improve existing 
ones into hygienic latrines for myself and for my neighbors by [end date].” 
Private Commitment: After organizing the cluster meeting, health motivators will visit each household in the 
cluster. The member of the household who had previously attended the meeting will make a commitment before 
the health motivator that he/she will transform their unhygienic latrines to hygienic ones within the time limit set 
by the project. The script of the pledge is as follows: 
“I hereby promise that I will do my best to set up hygienic latrines or improve existing ones into hygienic latrines 
for myself and for my surrounding neighbors by [end date].” 
Reward Components 
There are two threshold targets fixed for clusters, which is in terms of ownership of hygienic latrines. The 
lower threshold is 25% for [Union 1] while it is 33% for rest of the unions. The higher threshold is 50% for 
[Union 1] and 66% for the rest of the unions. 
Monetary Incentive:  A household will get a monetary reward of Tk. 250 or Tk. 500, depending on whether the 
household owns a hygienic latrine and the ownership of hygienic latrine at the cluster level is above the lower or 
the upper threshold, respectively. 
Certificate:  A household will get a certificate of hygiene attainment by a Member or the Chairman of the union, 
depending on whether the household owns a hygienic latrine and the ownership of hygienic latrine at the cluster 
level is above the lower or the upper threshold, respectively. 
At the end of the meeting, the name of the members of the group should be repeated again and the cluster leader 
should be handed a complete list containing names of all the members of the cluster so that the group has a better 
understanding of its members. 
Step-07: At the end of the meeting the Health Motivator will briefly recap the whole discussion from beginning 
to end and give thanks to everyone. 
Decisions: 
0. Every cluster must be treated the same way (except for the differences arising from the difference in treatment 
type).
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1. Census form has to be filled up in case of new members of the cluster. But add format does not need to be 
filled for this round.
2. The 'add or deduct' from has to be filled up if any household migrates. Use the code ‘8888’ as before in the tab 
and in the tab, manually add to the cluster the household has been joined.
3. Similar to last rounds, in case of absent households, the form will be filled by using absent code 9999. 
Collecting information about the latrine of absent household is still a must.
4. If any new member (whose name is not in the village list) joins the meeting then enter 7777, give a space and 
then enter the name in the tab.
5. Cluster leader cannot be changed unless it is a special situation.
6. If any household member uses two latrines then enter information about the hygienic one. If both the 
latrines are used equally then collect information about the one which is closer to dwelling and contact with the 
field supervisor.
7. Rewards will be given based on the total number of (hygienic) latrines in the cluster, not based on the 
number of households (or their access to hygienic latrines). Tell that to the household members a few 
times.
8. Each field supervisor must meet two Health Motivators everyday and oversee 3 meetings.
9. The cluster meeting in which the superivisor is monitoring, has to end with a one-minute summary 
discussion. This has to be recorded as well.
10. Field supervisor will completely cross check the information about the latine provided by Health 
Motivator.
11. Information on the hardcopy filled by Health Motivator cannot be sent to the server without the 
concerned filed supervisor checking it.
12. Audio record of each of the meeting must be kept in the tab and submitted to the concerned field 
supervisor.
13. In the certificate intervention, there is no need to mention whose signature is going to be put in. Just 
mention that the certificates will be issued by the Union Parishad.
14. Do not use the word ‘leader’ in the meeting.
15. Consecutive meetings in the same cluster cannot happen within 18-21 days.
16. The new deadline is [end date] to meet the hygienic latrine criteria. This should be mentioned instead of 
January 20.
17. Supervisors must monitor three meetings everyday. Cross checks of recordings of the Health Motivators will 
be done by the supervisors under the guidance of the Project Assistant and Project Associates.
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18. Health Motivators and Field Supervisors will be rewarded based on how well the cluster meetings have been 
conducted according the scripts. 
19. Need to finish meetings with the words that “This is the last time I have come to talk about hygienic latrines 
and the reward/certificate program (if applicable). The next time someone else will come to monitor your 
progress in achieving hygienic latrine status.” 
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